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DISCRIMINATION IN THE PROVISION OF
GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND S.15 OF THE CHARTER:
MAKING THE BEST OF THE JUDGEMENTS
IN EGAN, THIBAUDEAU, AND MIRON
JUDITH KEENE*

RtSUMEt
L' article 15 de la Chartecanadiennedes droits et libertis devrait 8tre un moyen
utile de rfsoudre bon nombre des probl~mes qui touchent les clients A faible
revenu. Dans cet article, l'auteure 6tudie les probl~mes et les questions soulevfs
lorsque l'on prepare une plaidoirie sur l'article 15. L'auteure traite des taches
nfcessaires suivantes lors d'un litige se bas ant sur 1'article 15 : r6sumer 1'analyse
de l'article 15; d6finir la notion de discrimination aux fins de l'article 15; 6tablir
les liens entre l'effet discriminatoire et le motif de distinction illicite; obtenir
l'inclusion du groupe reprfsent6 par le client aux fins de 1'article 15; et rdfuter
les arguments de l'article 1. Dans cet article, l'auteure 6tudie les rfcentes
decisions de la Cour supreme du Canada dans les causes Egan andNesbit versus
Canada,Thibaudeau versus Canada(M.R.N.) et Miron versus Trudel de meme
que la d6cision de la Cour d'appel de la Colombie-Britannique dans la cause
Eldridge versus British Columbia.
INTRODUCTION
Advocates who work with poor people are exposed daily to the fundamental
issues of human rights law. A poverty law practice is a "crash course" in the
power dynamics that are the bedrock of discrimination.
The problems associated with discrimination, which include inferior treatment,
exclusion and deprivation, are created or exacerbated by people who are in a
"majority" position. The people who are affected are in a "minority" position.
The terms used in this context have no direct relation to numbers. In the context
of discrimination, a "minority" position has to do with relative lack of power
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and influence. The lack of power and influence on the part of the minority is
coupled with a lack of recognition by the majority of the commonality of the
minority individual or group with the majority, and a consequent failure of
empathy. Important similarities between majority and minority are ignored by
the majority, and important differences are not taken into account.
It is no coincidence that minority status and poverty frequently go together.
Further, in North America, minority status has strong historical links to sex
(female), race/ethnicity (particularly non-"white"), disability (particularly visible disability), age (the extremes of the age spectrum), sexual orientation
(non-heterosexual), religion (non-"mainstream Christian"), citizenship (noncitizens) and other characteristics that have been recognised as grounds of
discrimination in provincial human rights legislation, the CanadianCharterof
Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter the Charter),or both.

Given all of the above, it would seem natural for poverty law practitioners and
their clients to turn to s.15 of the Charter as a source of assistance in their
ongoing battle for justice in matters involving government, at least insofar as
that battle is waged in courts and administrative tribunals. This has not happened
nearly as often as might be expected. For the purpose of this article, I will ignore
the obvious and massive impediment to Charterlitigation by poverty advocates;
scarcity of time and resources. One of the other reasons for the scarcity of s.15
challenges may be that the poverty law advocate who reads s. 15 decisions may
give up in despair.
Section 15 jurisprudence is not well developed at the Supreme Court of Canada
level, and the few Supreme Court decisions released to date are difficult to
understand and difficult to reconcile. In the lower courts, the few decisions that
have dealt with discrimination in the provision of government services are
mostly characterized by judicial failure to recognise discrimination.
On 25 May, 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada released three s.15 decisions,
all of which dealt with access to government services or benefits of some nature.
The decisions come at a time in Ontario in which the provincial government has
announced its intention to embark on a program of further deprivation of the
province's most vulnerable people. This may therefore be a good time to review
the issues fundamental to the type of s.15 challenge most likely to be of concern
to poverty law advocates.
Discrimination is an elastic term covering a myriad of behaviours, from the
violent aggression of the stereotypic racist to the oversight, resulting from
1.

CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11.
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ignorance, that makes life harder for the disabled. The business of s.15 is
discrimination, but the jurisprudence to date has not come to grips with the wide
range of issues that discrimination raises. Section 15 jurisprudence lags behind
human rights law in this respect, which is not surprising, given that s.15 has
been in effect only since 1987, whereas the provinces and the federal government have had human rights legislation for much longer; in Ontario for over
thirty years.
There are two types of discrimination that may give rise to a s. 15 claim. The
first is different treatment that results in disadvantage to those singled out
for the different treatment. An example is the rule, under current Ontario social
assistance legislation, that persons 18-21 years old living in their parents' home
are categorically ineligible for assistance. This situation is discriminatory because 18-21 year old people are treated differently, and the differentiation causes
a disadvantage to them.
The second type of discrimination occurs when everyone is treated the same.
This could occur, for example, if the government required everyone on social
assistance to attend personally at the welfare office every month to pick up his
or her benefits cheque. This rule, applied to everyone, would have a more
onerous effect on people with disabilities that affect their mobility than on those
who do not have such disabilities. This situation could be seen to be discriminatory because disabled people are affected by the rule in a worse way than
others. Same treatment that results in disadvantage is referred to in this
article as constructive discrimination.
The advocate who attempts to persuade a judge or other adjudicator that one of
the above-noted types of situations infringes s. 15 faces two major difficulties:
1. Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence is confusing. In my view, this is
caused in part by the Justices in a particular case, often with the best of
intentions, essaying general remarks to address issues that are not before
them. The members of the Court could also be criticised for not choosing their language more carefully, and using it more consistently, in a
complex area of law that requires strict attention to clarity in expression.
2. The crux of a s.15 claim is that existing systems that benefit the majority
be modified to provide fairness to a minority. Judicial reluctance to tamper with existing systems is unlikely to be overcome without a compelling explication of the law.
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This article will give a brief outline of the decisions in Egan and Nesbit v.
Canada,2 Thibaudeau v. Canada (M.N.R.), 3 and Miron v. Trudel.4 In the light
of these three cases and previous jurisprudence, and in the context of discrimination in government services, it will go on to address how the judgements affect
the necessary tasks in a s. 15 argument:
* summarizing the s.15 analysis
* defining discrimination for the purpose of s.15
* establishing the nexus between the discriminatory effect and the prohibited ground
* obtaining the inclusion of the group represented by the client for the
purpose of s.15
* rebutting s.1 arguments.

I.

THE DECISIONS IN EGAN, THIBA UDEA U, AND MIRON
In Egan, the appellants sought a declaration that the definition of "spouse"
contained in the OldAge Security Act 5 offends section 15 of the Charter because
it excludes same-sex spouses from spousal benefits. At the Supreme Court of
Canada, Justices L'Heureux-Dub6 and Cory (for Iacobucci, McLachlin, and
Sopinka) held that s.15 was infringed. Justice LaForest (for Lamer, Gonthier,
and Major) held that s. 15 was not infringed. Because Justice Sopinka agreed
with Justices LaForest, Lamer, Gonthier, and Major that any infringement was
saved by s.1, the appellants were unsuccessful.
In Thibaudeau, a divorced mother with custody of her two children challenged
the tax treatment of maintenance payments. Under the current tax laws, maintenance payments are added to the recipient spouse's income and are deducted
from the payor spouse's income. The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal
struck down s.56(l)(b), the inclusion provision, as discriminatory, contrary
to s. 15(1) of the Charter,on the basis of "family status". At the Supreme
Court of Canada, Justices Cory, Iacobucci, Gonthier, Sopinka and La Forest
held that s.15 was not infringed. Justices L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin

2.

(1993), 153 N.R. 161 (F.C.A.), (1995) C.E.B. & P.G.R. #8216 (S.C.C.), S.C.J. File No:
23636 [hereinafter Egan cited to S.C.J. File No: 23636].

3.

(1994), 167 N.R. 161 (F.C.A.), [1995] S.C.J. File No. 24154 [hereinafter Thibaudeau

4.

cited to S.C.J. No: 24154].
(1991), 4 0.R. (3d) 623, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 766 (Ont. C.A.), [1995] S.C.J. File No: 22744
[hereinafter Miron cited to S.C.J. File No: 22744].

5.

R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-9.
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dissented on this point, and also held that the infringement was not saved by s. 1.
In Miron, the appellant was a member of an unmarried couple with children. He
was injured while a passenger in an uninsured motor vehicle driven by an
uninsured driver. After the accident, the appellant made a claim for accident
benefits against his partner's insurance policy, which extended accident benefits
to the "spouse" of the policy holder. The respondent insurer denied his claim on
the ground that the appellant was not legally married to his partner, and hence
not her "spouse". When appellant sued the insurer, the insurer brought a
preliminary motion to determine whether the word "spouse", as used in the
applicable portions of the policy, included unmarried common law spouses. The
motions court judge found that "spouse" meant a person who is legally married.
The appellant appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the
policy terms, which were those of the standard automobile policy prescribed by
the InsuranceAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 218, discriminated against him in violation
of s. 15(1) of the Charter.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The appeal
was allowed by a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada comprised of
Justices L'Heureux-Dub6, McLachlin, Sopinka, Cory and Iacobucci, who held
that the restriction breached s. 15 and was not saved by s. 1. Chief Justice Lamer
and Justices La Forest, Gonthier and Major dissented on the application of s. 15.
II.
SUMMARIZING A DESCRIPTION OF THE S.15 ANALYSIS
It is customary to begin a factum with a brief summary of the "test" for
establishing a breach of s.15. The "test" should summarize what the equityseeker must establish before the enquiry shifts to s. 1. This would be easier if the
Supreme Court were more consistent in its language.
The first version ofa s. 15 test was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Andrews
v. Law Society of British Columbia,6 a case of discriminatory differentiation:
A complainant ... must show not only that he or she is not receiving equal
treatment before or under the law or that the law has a differential impact
on him or her in the protection or benefit accorded by law but, in addition,
7
must show that the legislative impact of the law is discriminatory.
Four years later, the Chief Justice of Canada addressed constructive discrimination in a dissenting judgement in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.). 8 The
judgement is useful to this analysis because it is one of the only two Supreme
6.
7.

[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 91 N.R. 255, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Andrews
cited to D.L.R.]
Ibid. at 24.

8.

(1993), 158 N.R. 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafterRodriguez].
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Court of Canada judgements to address constructive discrimination, 9 and it was
not a dissent in respect of the issue of whether discrimination existed, the rest
of the Court having assumed without deciding that s. 15 was infringed. The Chief
Justice summarized a three-part test based on Andrews:
The first step is to determine whether there is an infringement of one of the
rights to equality mentioned in that provision. The question essentially is
whether the statute makes distinctions between groups or classes of persons
based on personal characteristics. If such inequality is found, the second
step is to determine whether the inequality is discriminatory. Where there is
discrimination, finally, justifications are to be considered in light of s. I of
the Charter. 10
Since the third part of the test invokes s.1, it can be seen that, in respect of
s.15(1), the test used in Rodriguez is essentially the same as that used in
Andrews.
A.
Differences in approach to s.15 among Supreme Court Justices
The judgements in Egan, Thibaudeau, and Miron display a variety of ways of
stating the s.15 analysis, even among judges who agree that the section is
breached. The variations in terminology make it difficult to discern a pattern,
but it appears that the Andrews test remains in use by the majority. Justices
Lamer, LaForest, Gonthier, and Major appear to have added a new element to
the test that essentially imports section 1 into the section 15 analysis.
1.
Differences in general approach
At this point, four Justices of the Supreme Court are using one three-step
analysis, one is using a different three-step analysis, and four are using a
two-step analysis.
The minority approach places a significantly greater onus on the equity-seeker
than does the majority, and represents a departure from the Andrews test.
According to Justices Lamer, LaForest, Gonthier, and Major (in Egan,
Thibaudeau and Miron):
The analysis to be undertaken under s.15(l) of the Charterinvolves three
steps. The first step looks to whether the law has drawn a distinction between the claimant and others. The second step then questions whether the
distinction results in disadvantage, and examines whether the impugned law
imposes a burden, obligation or disadvantage on a group of persons to
9.

Symes v. M.N.R. (1993) 161 N.R. 243 (S.C.C.), [hereinafter Symes], the other Supreme
Court case which dealt with constructive discrimination, does not yield much direction
concerning "tests" for infringement of s.15

10.

Rodriguez supra,note 8 at para 145.
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which the claimant belongs which is not imposed on others, or does not
provide them with a benefit which it grants others. ... The third step assesses whether the distinction is based on an irrelevant personal characteristic which is either enumerated in s. 15(1) or one analogous thereto. 11
In Miron, Justice Gonthier did note that "the functional values underlying the
law may themselves be discriminatory."' 12 However, he went on to confine

"discriminatory" situations to
...case(s) where the underlying values are irrelevant to any legitimate legislative purpose. Relevancy is assessed by reference to a ground enumer13
ated in s. 15 or one analogous thereto.
Despite the added reference to s.15 grounds, Justice Gonthier seems to accept

that the existence of "any legitimate legislative purpose" nullifies discrimination. As applied by Justices LaForest, Lamer, Gonthier, and Major, "relevancy
to the functional values underlying the law" means that the purpose behind the
law is accepted without question as valid and beyond challenge under s. 15 as
long as it is "legitimate". All of this analysis is to take place before s.1 comes

into play.
The source of this departure from Andrews can be seen in Justice LaForest's
judgement in Egan. In that judgement, he cites Justice McIntyre's test in
Andrews as quoted above, but gives Justice McIntyre's words a novel interpretation that adds to the burden on the equity-seeker:
The nature of discrimination within the meaning of s. 15(1) of the Charter
was first discussed by this Court in the seminal case of Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. In the principal reasons in
that case, McIntyre J., at p. 175, underlined the importance in a constitutional document, which is not easily modified, of achieving a workable balance that permits government to perform effectively its function of making
ongoing choices in the interests of society and the work of the courts in ensuring protection for the equality rights described in s. 15. As he stated, what
we must do is "to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and, at the same time, for the unremitting protection" of equality rights. And he warned (see p. 168), as I did in my
separate reasons, that not all distinctions resulting in disadvantage to a particular group will constitute discrimination. It would bring the legitimate
work of our legislative bodies to a standstill if the courts were to question
every distinction that had a disadvantageous effect on an enumerated or

11.

Miron, supra,note4perGonthierJ. atpara 13-14.

12.

Ibid. at para 15.

13.

Ibid. at para 15.
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analogous group. This would open up a s. I enquiry in every case involving
a protected group. As I put it in Andrews, at p. 194, "it was never intended
in enacting s. 15 that it become a tool for the wholesale subjection to judicial scrutiny of variegated legislative choices in no way infringing on values fundamental to a free and democratic society". 14
He then goes on to introduce the irrelevancy requirement discussed above.
The notion that the equity-seeker would have to prove
a)

that a distinction is created or effected by legislation or government
action,

b)

that a burden, obligation or disadvantage is thereby created for a group
that is protected by the anti-discrimination provision, and

c)

that the above situation "is discriminatory"

is foreign to the body of human rights law that has developed under federal and
provincial human rights legislation. In all cases, proof of points a and b
constitutes proof of point c. The Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed to
human rights law as an aid in the analysis of s.15, but no member of the Court
other than Justice LaForest has ever suggested such a radical departure from the
jurisprudence. 15 Certainly, Justice McIntyre did not do so. Justice McIntyre
addressed the differences between considering discrimination in human rights
law and in the constitutional context in Andrews. 16 Had he felt that such a
difference in approach was warranted, presumably he would have said so at that
point.
A reading in context of the parts of Justice McIntyre's decision in Andrews cited
by Justice LaForest indicates that Justice McIntyre went no farther than to
suggest that not all legislative distinctions attract Charterprotection. In fact, his
only clear conclusion as to the limitations built into s.15 is that "The words
'without discrimination' ... limit those distinctions which are forbidden by the
section to those which involve prejudice or disadvantage."' 17 Justice McIntyre
did state that discrimination must be shown "in addition to" unequal treatment.

14.

Supra, note 2 at para 7.

15.

The introduction of this approach, and its associated requirement that the claimant
prove "irrelevancy" is also a change from Justice LaForest's own position in McKinney
v. University of Guelph [1990] 3 S.C.R 229, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 545 [hereinafter McKinney].

16.

Supra, note6at 18-19.

17.

Ibid. at 23.
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However, his remarks came at the conclusion of a review of three "approaches
to s.15", 18 which were:
1. that any legislative distinction constituted a prima facie breach of s. 15,
2. that only "unreasonable" or "unjustifiable" distinctions breached s.15, and
3. that breach of s.15 should be interpreted purposively, in relation to the
"enumerated and analogous grounds".
Justice McIntyre firmly rejected approaches 1 and 2 above. The remarks that
surround his rejection of approach number 2, above, included a concern that s. 1
should not be imported into s. 15. These remarks quite clearly indicate disagreement with Justice LaForest's approach, and incidentally with the addition of the
"irrelevancy" requirement posited by Justices Lamer, LaForest, Gonthier and
Major.
Justice L'Heureux-Dubf's test for breach of s. 15, outlined below, also separates
the requirement to establish "that this distinction is 'discriminatory' within the
meaning of s. 15" 19 from the requirements to establish "that there is a legislative
distinction" and "that this distinction results in a denial of one of the four
equality rights on the basis of the rights claimant's membership in an identifiable
group". However, in application, she makes it clear that her third requirement
is not a discrete one. It is met if the claimant can establish that the "distinction"
is "capable of either promoting or perpetuating the view that the individual
adversely affected by this distinction is less capable, or less worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally
deserving of concern, respect, and consideration". 20 The claimant may do this
by adducing evidence as to the nature of the group affected, and the nature of
the interest affected. This line of reasoning clearly means that the existence of
discrimination is established by way of evidence concerning the nature of the
"legislative distinction" and the nature of the affected group. Nothing more is
required to establish a breach of s. 15.
The initially misleading way of stating and applying the s. 15 test that is used by
Justice McIntyre and Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 is a typical majority approach of
the Supreme Court in s.15 cases, used by the majority of the Court in discussing
the proposition that not all distinctions are discriminatory, and therefore not all
2
distinctions breach s.15. 1

18.

Ibid. at 21-24.

19.

Egan, supra,note 2 at para 55.

20.

Ibid. at para 56.

21.

See the review of cases set out by the Chief Justice in Rodriguez, supra, note 8 at para
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Justices Cory, lacobucci, McLachlin, and Sopinka can be seen to outline the
steps in their analysis in two slightly different ways, when their decision in Egan,
written by Justices Cory and Iacobucci, is compared with the adoption by the
others of Justice McLachlin's decision in Miron.
In Egan, Justices Cory and Iacobucci outlined the analysis as follows:
The first step is to determine whether, due to a distinction created by the
questioned law, a claimant's right to equality before the law, equality under
the law, equal protection of the law or equal benefit of the law has been denied. During this first step, the inquiry should focus upon whether the challenged law has drawn a distinction between the claimant and others, based on
personal characteristics ... the second step must be to determine whether the
distinction created by the law results in discrimination. In order to make this
determination, it is necessary to consider first, whether the equality right
was denied on the basis of a personal characteristic which is either enumerated in s. 15(1) or which is analogous to those enumerated, and second,
whether that distinction has the effect on the claimant of imposing a burden,
obligation or disadvantage not imposed upon others or of withholding or
22
limiting access to benefits or advantages which are available to others.
... the resolution of the question as to whether there is discrimination under
s. 15(1) must be kept distinct from the determination as to whether or not
there is justification for that discrimination under s. I of the Charter.23
In Miron, Justice McLachlin, with Justices Sopinka, Cory and Iacobucci concurring, summarized the s.15 analysis as follows:
I take the view that an analysis under s. 15(1) of the Charter involves two
stages. First, the claimant must show that the impugned legislation treats
him or her differently by imposing a burden not imposed on others or denying a benefit granted to others. Second, the claimant must show that this unequal treatment is discriminatory. This requires one to consider whether the
impugned legislative distinction is based on one of the grounds of
discrimination enumerated in s. 15(1) or on an analogous ground. In the
great majority of cases the existence of prejudicial treatment based on an
enumerated or analogous ground leads to a conclusion that s. 15(1) has
been infringed. Distinctions made on these grounds are typically based on
stereotypical attitudes about the presumed characteristics or situations of individuals rather than their true situation or actual ability. Once a breach has
144-154, and the unanimous judgement in R. v. Turpin, Siddiqui and Clauzel [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1296,96 N.R. 115, 34 O.A.C. 115,48 C.C.C. (3d) 8, at C.C.C. 33-36 [hereinafter Turpin cited to S.C.R.l. See also: Egan, supra, note 2 at par 127 and 130,
Thibaudeausupra, note 3 at para 177 and Miron, supra, note 4 at para 140.

22.

Supra, note 2 at para 130-132.

23.

Ibid. at para 136.
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been established, it is for the government to justify the inequality under s. 1
of the Charter... 24
Justice LVHeureux-Dub6 was consistent, in Egan, Thibaudeau and Miron, in
stating a new approach to s.15: she urged more focus on the definition of
discrimination, and less on whether the claimant fits into enumerated or analo-

gous grounds.
In my view, for an individual to make out a violation of their rights under s.
15(1) of the Charter, he or she must demonstrate the following three things:
(1) that there is a legislative distinction;
(2) that this distinction results in a denial of one of the four equality rights
on the basis of the rights claimant's membership in an identifiable group;
(3) that this distinction is "discriminatory" within the meaning of s. 15.25

Remarks by Justices L'Heureux-Dubd, McLachlin, Cory and lacobucci which
further define the term "discriminatory" are set out in Part II below.

2. Differences in regard to adding an "irrelevancy" requirement
Obviously, problems arise for the equity-seeker from the new approach to s. 15
suggested by Justices LaForest, Lamer, Gonthier, and Major. The main problem
is caused by the novel stress laid by these Justices on the term "irrelevant":
... in assessing relevancy for this purpose one must look at 'the nature of
the personal characteristic and its relevancy to the functional values underlying the law' ... one must necessarily undertake a form of comparative
analysis to determine whether particular facts give rise to inequality ... this
comparative analysis must be linked to an examination of the larger context, and in particular with an understanding that the Charter was ... 'not
enacted in a vacuum' ... but must 'be placed in its proper linguistic, philo26
sophic and historical contexts'.

Justices Cory, Iacobucci, McLachlin, Sopinka and L'Heureux-Dub6 specifically
disagreed2 7 with the adding on of a requirement that "irrelevancy", as elucidated

24.

Supra, note 4 at para 177.

25.

Egan, supra, note 2 at para 55.

26.

Ibid. per LaForest J. at para 13, quoting Gonthier J. in Miron, supra, note 4 and Dickson C.J.C. in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 and R. v. Cotroni;
Papaliav. The Queen (1979), 45 C.C.C. (2d) I (S.C.C.).

27.

Ibid. per L'Heureux-Dub6 J. at para 42-45 and per Cory, lacobucci JJ. at para 136; see
also: Thibaudeau, supra, note 3 per Cory, lacobucci JJ. at para 154-157 and Miron,
supra, note 4 per McLachlin J. at para 133-139.
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by Justices LaForest, Lamer, Gonthier, and Major, be demonstrated by the
equity-seeker. All five of the remaining Justices held that the irrelevancy
requirement imports an analysis better left under s.l. Justices L'Heureux-Dub6,
Cory, Iacobucci and McLachlin pointed out that the irrelevancy requirement
permits circular reasoning and an inadequate response to the obvious substantive purpose of s.15.
B.
Stating a summary of s.15 analysis for a particular case
It is essential that the advocate be able to set out a coherent theory of discrimination in any individual case; something along the lines of the following:
Regulation A excludes people under the age of 18 from (benefit). This differentiation is discriminatory on the ground of age.
Regulation B imposes the requirement that, in order to obtain (X service),
every applicant must attend in person at the office of the relevant government agency. This requirement imposes a particular hardship on persons
with disabilities that affect their mobility, and as such is constructively discriminatory against persons with physical disabilities.
The next step is to set out the test that organizes the s.15 argument, for the
purpose of the factum.
The following elements are common to all of the tests set out in Egan,
Thibaudeauand Miron.

distinction: The equity-seeker must establish that the impugned legislative
provision or government action puts him or her in a different position from
others. In Egan, Thibaudeau and Miron, the phrase most commonly used
was that the law "draws" or "creates" distinctions. This is understandable in
the light of the fact that these were cases of discriminatory differentiation. In
constructive discrimination cases, the essence of the problem is that the law
in itself creates no distinctions; the discrimination is created by everybody
being treated the same. The Chief Justice in Rodriguez also addressed distinction by adverting to whether the statute makes distinctions, despite the
fact that Rodriguez was a case of constructive discrimination. A phrase that
is somewhat more suitable to constructive discrimination cases is used by
Justice McLachlin in Miron, above. She says that "the claimant must show
that the impugned legislation treats him or her differently by imposing a burden not imposed on others or denying a benefit granted to others". She goes
on to call this a "legislative distinction".
" personal characteristics/grounds of discrimination: The equity-seeker
must establish that the impugned legislative provision or government action
is "based on" a personal characteristic or on membership in a group enumerated in s. 15, or in an unenumerated group. (Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 speaks
of "an identifiable group".) The term "a distinction ... based on" is a natural
one to use in cases of discriminatory differentiation. As noted above, in cases
of constructive discrimination, the legislation in itself creates no distinction,

Government Services and Section 15 of the Charter

much less one "based on" membership in an enumerated, unenumerated or
identifiable group. The Chief Justice in Rodriguez contributed to the potential for confusion in using essentially the same phrase in a case of constructive discrimination, although he provided some clarification later on in the
decision, which will be discussed below. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 provides a
more widely-applicable phrase when she speaks of "a denial of ... equality
rights on the basis of the rights claimant's membership in an identifiable
group".
burden, obligation or disadvantage: The equity-seeker must establish that
the impugned legislative provision or government action creates a burden,
obligation or disadvantage: Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 speaks of "a denial of
one of the four equality rights".

It is virtually impossible to construct an all-purpose test to guide an analysis of
the facts of a case in the light of s. 15. Clearly, the Supreme Court is finding it

heavy going. Rather than trying to devise an all-purpose test, it might make sense
to set out two slightly differing tests; one for cases of discriminatory differentiation, and one for cases of constructive discrimination. Examples follow:
discriminatorydifferentiation:
1. Does the law or government action create a distinction that affects a
group identified by a personal characteristic?
2. Does the distinction create a burden, obligation or disadvantage for this
group, compared to others?
constructive discrimination:
1. Does the application of the law or government action affect a group
identified by a personal characteristic?
2. Does the application create a burden, obligation or disadvantage for this
group, compared to others?
III. DEFINING DISCRIMINATION
As noted above, government benefits are often denied or restricted on the basis
of differentiation between classes of people. Differentiation by sex, age, marital

status or family status, for example, is common. In other cases, a condition or
restriction associated with a benefit and applied universally acts as a barrier to
a particular class of person, or results in more hardship to that class than to
others. For convenience, the former type of situation will be referred to as

discriminatory differentiation, and the latter as constructive discrimination.
The two types of discrimination will be discussed in detail below.
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A.
Discriminatory Differentiation
To date, most Supreme Court of Canada s. 15 judgements have been given in
cases of discriminatory differentiation rather than constructive discrimination.
The Court has provided some general statements that apply to both types of
discrimination, and these are set out below. However, it should be noted that
some issues that are unique to constructive discrimination have not been
addressed.

In Andrews,2 8 McIntyre J. wrote the majority opinion on the interpretation of
section 15(1). He addressed primary principles before attempting a preliminary
definition of discrimination. He stressed the importance of the effect of impugned legislation or government action:
To approach the ideal of full equality before and under the law-and in
human affairs an approach is all that can be expected-the main consideration must be the impact of the law on the individual or the group concemed. Recognizing that there will always be an infinite variety of personal
characteristics, capacities, entitlements and merits among those subject to a
law, there must be accorded, as nearly as may be possible, an equality of
benefit and protection and no more of the restrictions, penalties or burdens
imposed upon one than another. In other words, the admittedly unattainable
ideal should be that a law expressed to bind all should not because of irrelevant personal differences have a more burdensome or less beneficial impact
29
on one than another.

He stated that the promotion of equality involves the promotion of a society:
... in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law
30
as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.

Justice McIntyre addressed the definition of discrimination under s. 15 of the
Charter with reference to the law developed under the Human Rights Acts of
various Canadian jurisdictions. He stated that discrimination under s. 15 would
"be of the same nature and in descriptive terms will fit the concept of discrimination developed under the Human Rights Acts". 3 1 The principles which had
been applied under those Acts were "equally applicable in considering questions
of discrimination under s. 15(1)".32 In the context of Andrews, a case of
discriminatory differentiation rather than constructive discrimination, he stated:
28.
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... discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or
not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which
withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a
group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on
33
an individual's merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.
Although it was not necessary to do so in the context of Andrews, Justice
McIntyre also indicated that constructive discrimination was also encompassed

by s.15.
In the most recent trilogy, Justices LaForest, Lamer, Gonthier, and Major, as

well as Cory, Iacobucci, McLachlin, and Sopinka quoted the above-noted
Andrews definition at various times. The following further definitions were
proposed:
Justice Cory (on behalf of Iacobucci, McLachlin and Sopinka) in Egan:
... the existence of discrimination is determined by assessing the prejudicial
effect of the distinction against s. 15(l)'s fundamental purpose of prevent34
ing the infringement of essential human dignity.
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in Miron, Egan and Thibaudeau:
A distinction is discriminatory within the meaning of s. 15 where it is capable of either promoting or perpetuating the view that the individual adversely affected by this distinction is less capable, or less worthy of
recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society,
35
equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration.
Arguably, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's definition comes the closest to a succinct
distillation of the jurisprudence to date.
Another point which is clear from an examination of Miron, Egan and
Thibaudeauis that the majority of the Supreme Court holds that discrimination
must be assessed from a subjective as well as an objective point of view:
Justice Cory (for Iacobucci, McLachlin, and Sopinka) in Egan:
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Ultimately, it must be remembered that the question as to whether or not
there is discrimination should be addressed from the perspective of the per36
son claiming a Charter violation.
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in Egan :
This examination should be undertaken from a subjective-objective perspective: i.e. from the point of view of the reasonable person, dispassionate
and fully apprised of the circumstances, possessed of similar attributes to,
and under similar circumstances as, the group of which the rights claimant
37
is a member.

Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 went on to suggest that, in assessing subjectively and
objectively whether the impact of legislation or government action is discriminatory:
... it is instructive to consider two categories of factors: (1) the nature of the
group adversely affected by the distinction and (2) the nature of the interest
38
adversely affected by the distinction.
In respect of the nature of the group, she pointed out that:
... groups that are more socially vulnerable will experience the adverse effects of a legislative distinction more vividly than if the same distinction
39
were directed at a group which is not similarly socially vulnerable.
In respect of the nature of the interest, she pointed out that:
... the more severe and localized the economic consequences on the affected group, the more likely that the distinction responsible for these consequences is discriminatory within the meaning of s. 15 of the Charter.40

She illustrated the above points as follows:
If a projectile were thrown against a soft surface, then it would leave a
larger scar than if it were thrown against a resilient surface. In fact, the
depth of the scar inflicted will generally be a function of both the nature of
the affected surface and the nature of the projectile used....No one would
dispute that two identical projectiles, thrown at the same speed, may nonetheless leave a different scar on two different types of surfaces. Similarly,
groups that are more socially vulnerable will experience the adverse effects
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of a legislative distinction more vividly than if the same distinction were directed at a group which is not similarly socially vulnerable. As such, a distinction may be discriminatory in its impact upon one group yet not
discriminatory in its impact upon another group.
... In the same way that a very dense projectile will impact upon a surface
more sharply than a less dense projectile, an examination of the nature of
the interest affected by the impugned distinction is helpful in determining
whether that distinction is discriminatory. This examination requires an
evaluation of both economic and non-economic elements ...
Referring back to our analogy once again, if the projectile is dense enough
and thrown hard enough, then it will leave a mark on even the most resilient
of surfaces. Similarly, the more fundamental the interest affected or the
more serious the consequences of the distinction, the more likely that the
impugned distinction will have a discriminatory impact even with respect to
41
groups that occupy a position of advantage in society.
1.

Judicial reluctance to recognise discriminatory differentiation in
benefit cases
When decisions from the lower courts and administrative tribunals are compared
to the judgements of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is clear that even the
Supreme Court's earlier pronouncements, such as those made in Andrews, have
failed to make much impact on the judiciary's grasp of concepts of discrimination at the lower court level. An example can be seen in the impatient reaction
of some judges to the proposition that government can discriminate by denying
a resource, as opposed to discriminating by inflicting something on the affected
group. In some lower courts the reluctance of judges to recognise the denial of
a government benefit as discrimination has led to some truly acrobatic judicial
reasoning. The root of this reluctance is probably personal political views; it can
also be seen as a reluctance to apply the Charteras a "sword" to obtain rights,
as well as a shield against government interference.
Three examples of judicial balking in different-treatment benefits cases are set out
below. Note that, in two of these cases, the initial finding that there was no
discrimination was reversed on appeal; a clear encouragement to persistence on the
part of the advocate.
In McLeod v. Canada,42 the wife of a deceased person was refused a CPP
survivor's pension because the couple had not been cohabiting for eleven years
prior to his death. She challenged the refusal under s.15, alleging that the CPP
definition of "spouse" effects discrimination on the ground of marital status.
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The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench denied the claim for two reasons. The first
was that it was the action of her spouse and another person "which led to the
denial to her of survivor's benefits" rather than her marital status. The second
was that marital status was not a "personal characteristic", because "the actions
of two other people (were) necessary to place one within a particular group".
No authority was cited for this reasoning. It is clearly at odds with the views of
the majority of the Supreme Court in Thibaudeau and Miron, and with the obiter
43
of Justice Iacobucci in Symes v. M.N.R.
In Egan and Nesbit v. Canada,44 at the Federal Court of Appeal level, the
majority allowed that sexual orientation could be an analogous ground of
discrimination for the purpose of section 15, 45 but dismissed the appeal, concluding that the definition of "spouse" for CPP purposes was not discriminatory.
While the majority Federal Court of Appeal judgement in Egan is incoherent,
it would appear that there were four reasons for the result reached.
First, the majority took the view 46 that, because the Supreme Court in Andrews
had rejected the notion that the "similarly situated" test was the relevant test in
establishing discrimination, no comparative analysis could be made. This unnecessarily restrictive approach enabled the court to ignore the relevance of the
trial judge's finding that, had this been a heterosexual couple, the spousal
allowance would have been granted.
Secondly, the majority focused on the statement in Andrews that a person should
not be deprived of a benefit because of a distinction based on irrelevant personal
differences. Astonishingly, the court inferred from that statement that there is a
"legal requirement that a distinction be based on an irrelevant personal difference" in order for discrimination to be established. The court concluded 47 that
this "requirement" precluded a finding of discrimination in this case because
sexual orientation was highly relevant to the appellant's claim.
Thirdly, the majority took the view 4 8 that because other groups were excluded,
such as unrelated housemates and brothers and sisters who lived together, the
exclusion was not discriminatory. (This reasoning seems to ignore the Court's
own earlier finding that the "similarly situated" test was not to be used.)
43.
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Finally, the court made findings concerning the purpose of the legislation. Since
there was no need to refer to section 1, it is not clear why it did so. Possibly it
was an attempt to respond to an argument that the legislation deliberately
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. The majority accepted 49 that
the objective of the legislation was to ameliorate the severe cut in income
experienced by one-"breadwinner" couples, where the breadwinner becomes
eligible for a pension before the other spouse. The evidence as to legislative
intention that was placed before the court clearly contemplated "traditional"
heterosexual marriages in which the wife was younger than the husband.
On appeal, five out of nine Supreme Court of Canada Justices held that s. 15 was
infringed, using the differing analyses noted above. (Five out of nine also held
that the infringement was justified under s. 1, which was why the Egan appeal
was ultimately unsuccessful.)
The third case of failure by a lower court to recognise discrimination was
rectified by the judgement of Arbour, J.A. in Re Eaton and Brant County Board
50
of Education.
In the Re Eaton case, the legislative provision at issue was s. 8(3) of the
EducationAct:5 1
The Minister shall ensure that all exceptional children in Ontario have
available to them ...appropriate special education programs ...and shall
provide for ... parents or guardians to appeal the appropriateness of the special education placement, and for these purposes the Minister shall,
(a) require school boards to implement procedures for ...identification of
the learning abilities and needs of pupils ...
(b) in respect of special education programs ... define exceptionalities of
of exceptional pupils ...
pupils, and prescribe classes ...

The matter at issue was the decision of a school board's Identification, Placement and Review Committee (the IPRC) to place a disabled child in a segregated
class rather than let her remain in the general primary school population. The
test used by the IPRC in making the decision was whether the child's "special
needs can be met best in a regular class or in a special class". 5 2 On judicial
review, the appellants argued that the test was discriminatory and that s.15 of
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the Charterrequired that there be a presumption that disabled students would
attend regular classrooms, unless those proposing a segregated classroom could
establish that a segregated placement would provide a better educational experience than an integrated classroom. Divisional Court dismissed the application,
stating that it had "great difficulty in appreciating how the CanadianCharterof
Rights and Freedoms ... [could] create a presumption in favour of one pedagog53
ical theory over another".
The Court of Appeal unanimously held that the Divisional Court had
mischaracterized the issue. Arbour J.A. stated that, "in legal terms, the two
pedagogical theories are not on the same footing if one produces discrimination
54
and the other does not."
In considering whether segregated schooling could be discriminatory in these
circumstances, the test used by the Court was whether it could be considered a
"disadvantage, or the deprivation of a benefit". 55 The Court considered the
subjective views of the appellant, but indicated that "subjective perception is
not in itself determinative of the issue". 56 The judgement went on briefly to
consider evidence as to the social, historical and political context pertaining to
exclusion of disabled persons from everyday life, before concluding that unwanted segregation was a disadvantage. Having concluded that the treatment
resulted in disadvantage, the Court concluded that it was discriminatory.
The Court went on to find that the section of the EducationAct which granted
a discretion which could be applied in a discriminatory way was not protected
by s. I because it did not infringe Charterrights as little as possible:
Although the Act does not mandate a Charterinfringement, it grants a discretion which may be used, and was used in this case, in a way that infringes s.15: see Carol Rogerson, 'The Judicial Search for Appropriate
Remedies under the Charter: Examples of Overbreadth and Vagueness" in
Sharpe, ed., CharterLitigation (1987), at p.291. Since it permits a Charter
infringement, without further guidance, I cannot say that the Act infringes
the equality rights of disabled students as little as possible. 57
The remedy granted in Re Eaton was to curtail the discretion conferred upon
school boards under the EducationAct.

53.

Ibid. at 10.

54.

Ibid. at 12.

55.

Ibid. at 13.

56.

Ibid.

57.

Ibid. at 20.

Government Services and Section 15 of the Charter

Section 8 of the Act should be read to include a direction that, unless the
parents of a child who has been identified as exceptional by reason of ...
disability consent ... the school board must provide a placement that is the
least exclusionary from the mainstream and still reasonably capable of
58
meeting the child's special needs.
Rebutting predictable arguments in discriminatory differentiation
cases
There is little or no support for the following arguments in the caselaw.
Nevertheless, they have been made in a number of cases, and continue to be
made.
2.

a) The Charter does not protect economic rights
An economic interest, the "right" to be admitted to a provincial Bar in order to
practice law, was protected in Andrews. However, the above-noted argument,
stated or unstated, appears to underlie many cases of judicial reluctance to
recognise discrimination. The only authority for such a sweeping statement is
jurisprudence under s.7 of the Charter, and even there, there is room for
argument, as noted in A.G. Quebec v. Irwin Toy Ltd.59 As Justice L'HeureuxDub6 points out in Egan, economic disadvantage can be among the indicia of
discrimination:
The Charter is a document of civil, political and legal rights. It is not a charter of economic rights. This is not to say, however, that economic prejudices
or benefits are irrelevant to determinations under s. 15 of the Charter. Quite
the contrary. Economic benefits or prejudices are relevant to s. 15, but are
more accurately regarded as symptomatic of the types of distinctions that
60
are at the heart of s. 15: those that offend inherent human dignity.
... the Charter is not a document of economic rights and freedoms. Rather,
it only protects "economic rights" when such protection is necessarily incidental to protection of the worth and dignity of the human person (i.e. necessary to the protection of a "human right"). Nonetheless, the nature,
quantum and context of an economic prejudice or denial of such a benefit are
important factors in determining whether the distinction from which the differing economic consequences flow is one which is discriminatory. If all other
things are equal, the more severe and localized the economic consequences on
the affected group, the more likely that the distinction responsible for these
consequences is discriminatory within the meaning of s. 15 of the Charter.
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Although a search for economic prejudice may be a convenient means to
begin a s. 15 inquiry, a conscientious inquiry must not stop here. The discriminatory calibre of a particular distinction cannot be fully appreciated
without also evaluating the constitutional and societal significance of the
interest(s) adversely affected. Other important considerations involve determining whether the distinction somehow restricts access to a fundamental
social institution, or affects a basic aspect of full membership in Canadian
61
society (e.g.. voting, mobility).

In view of the reluctance of some judges to recognise discrimination in the
provision of benefits, it may be useful to stress the fact that, in most cases put

forward by poverty law advocates, there is no suggestion that a new system of
benefits be created, but that the existing one be administered in a non-discrim-

inatory fashion. As Justice Cory (for Iacobucci, McLachlin, and Sopinka) noted
in Egan:
It is clear that Parliament does not have any constitutional obligation to provide benefits. However, once the decision has been made to confer a bene62
fit, it cannot be applied in a discriminatory manner.
b) Legislation whose purpose is social, rather than punitive, should receive

a lighter standard of review
There is no support for this argument in relation to the s. 15 analysis. Even Justice
Sopinka's remarks, reviewed below, about how "government must be accorded

some flexibility in extending social benefits" were made in the context of a
section 1 analysis.
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in Egan, dealt with this argument (also in the context

of s.1):
... The mere fact ... that legislation is "social" in nature is not, by itself, a reason for increased deference. In fact, to defer to the legislative prerogative in circumstances where social science views do not substantially conflict, and where
there is a reasonable, alternative means of fulfilling the legislative objective in a
way that would materially lessen the magnitude of the rights violation, would
frustrate the purpose of the Charter. 63

The Attorney General of Canada argues that the impugned legislation is social,
not punitive, and should thereby enjoy a somewhat more deferential standard of
review by this Court. As I have already noted, I do not believe that such defer-
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ence is appropriate when there is a reasonable alternative, readily available, that
is not the subject of conflicting social science views, that would materially
lessen the effect of the rights violation to the affected group, and that would not
result in a concomitant prejudice to another group. To accord deference merely
because the issue is a "social" one would be to issue a licence to discriminate in
favour of the status quo.64
c)
The restrictionsat issue are not "because of' enumerated or analogous
grounds, but "because of" whatever rationalethe government puts forward
for the legislation or government action.
A first rebuttal to this argument is often the fact that the legislation or government action does specifically differentiate according to an enumerated or
unenumerated ground of discrimination.
Other points that can be made in response to this argument include the following:
i)

The Supreme Court has reiterated that the discrimination analysis
focusses on effect, and that intent is relatively unimportant;

ii)

Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has rejected the proposition
that causal connection is to be a matter of narrow interpretation;
and

iii)

Human rights jurisprudence, which is applicable in the interpretation
of s. 15, supports the proposition that, if one of the reasons for differential treatment is prohibited, the action is discriminatory.

The above-noted points are further elaborated below.
i)
focus on effect
In Andrews, McIntyre J. defined discrimination as:
a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating
to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect
of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or
group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society.
65
(emphasis added)
It is important to note that Andrews was a case of differential treatment, as were
the numerous cases since Andrews, including Miron and Egan, in which all
members of the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that effect, not intention,
is the important factor in assessing discrimination. Concentration on effect is
not limited to cases of constructive discrimination.
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ii) causal connection is not to be a matter of narrow interpretation
Justice Cory in Egan (for Iacobucci, McLachlin and Sopinka), responded to an
argument that the legislative distinction in question was between "spousal" and
"non-spousal" relationships rather than between homosexual and heterosexual
relationships:
To treat persons of the same sex who represent themselves as a common
law couple differently from persons of the opposite sex representing themselves as a common law couple is a differentiation which must be based
upon sexual orientation. I would add that, although the statute appears to do
so, it is not necessary for the challenged legislation to directly identify sexual orientation as a criterion for eligibility. For example, it has been held
that a distinction made on the basis of pregnancy constitutes discrimination
on the basis of sex. Similarly, differential treatment in the form of sexual
harassment constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex ... What is relevant in resolving the issue is whether the difference in treatment affects the
individual or group in a manner which is related to their personal characteristics. To put it another way, the question is whether the difference in
treatment is closely related to a personal characteristic of a group to
which the claimant belongs ... It may be correct to say that being in a
same-sex relationship is not necessarily the defining characteristic of being
homosexual. Yet, only homosexual individuals will form a part of a samesex common law couple. It is the sexual orientation of the individuals involved which leads to the formation of the homosexual couple. The sexual
orientation of the individual members cannot be divorced from the homosexual couple. To find otherwise would be as wrong as saying that being
pregnant had nothing to do with being female.(emphasis added) 6 6
iii)
if one of the reasonsfor differential treatment is prohibited,the action is
discriminatory
On many occasions, most recently in Symes, 67 the Supreme Court has advised
that s. 15 be interpreted in the light of existing human rights jurisprudence. In
cases of direct discrimination, it is settled law that if one of the reasons for an
action is prohibited, the action contravenes equity legislation. The source of that
law is the R. v. Bushnell Communications Ltd 68 line of cases. That case involved
a breach of the reprisal section of the Canada Labour Code. In affirming the
decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that it was sufficient that union
membership was a "proximate cause" for the dismissal at issue, and it was
immaterial if there were other proximate causes, such as inability to get along
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with fellow workers. Bushnell has been relied on in a long line of human rights
69
tribunal cases.

d)

The applicants are in their situation by choice, and the existence of

this "choice" negates a finding of discrimination.
The tendency to focus on choice, real or imaginary, is incongruent with equity
jurisprudence, because lack of choice is not a built-in requirement of the s. 15
categories. For example, religion, which is not immutable, is an enumerated
ground. Further, citizenship, which is not immutable, has been accepted as a
non-enumerated ground in Andrews.
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in Miron held that the absence or presence of an
element of "choice" should not be determinative of s. 15 analysis. She went on
to assess "choice" on the subjective reality of the equity-seeker:
... this argument is premised upon an important and, in my mind, unchallenged assumption: that the majority of unmarried persons living in a relationship of some interdependence and duration are, indeed, exercising a
"free choice". In my respectful view, this assumption may mischaracterize
the reality of a significant number of persons in non-traditional relationships. This silent and oft-forgotten group constitutes couples in which one
person wishes to be in a relationship of publicly acknowledged permanence
70
and interdependence and the other does not.
Justice McLachlin in Miron (for Sopinka, Cory, and Iacobucci) took the same

approach:
In theory, the individual is free to choose whether to marry or not to marry.
In practice, however, the reality may be otherwise. The sanction of the
union by the state through civil marriage cannot always be obtained. The
law; the reluctance of one's partner to marry; financial, religious or social
constraints - these factors and others commonly function to prevent partners who otherwise operate as a family unit from formally marrying. In
short, marital status often lies beyond the individual's effective control. In
this respect, marital status is not unlike citizenship, recognized as an analogous ground in Andrews: the individual exercises limited but not exclusive
71
control over the designation.
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B.
Constructive Discrimination
The caselaw on discrimination that does not arise from differentiation on a
prohibited ground, in both human rights and Charterjurisprudence, is characterized by wide variation in the terminology used by adjudicators. Discrimination that results from same treatment has been called "indirect discrimination"
and is most often referred to as "adverse effect" discrimination. 72 There is often
some mention or discussion at the outset as to whether the impugned provision
or action is "seemingly neutral" or "facially neutral" (that is, whether the actor
could have foreseen the discriminatory consequences), despite the fact that
motivation has been confirmed to be irrelevant to the question of whether
discrimination exists. For the purpose of this article, discrimination that does
not arise from differentiation will be referred to as constructive discrimination
because the frequent use of the term "adverse effect" in cases involving differentiation (such as McKinney v. University of Guelph73) makes it confusing to
do otherwise.
As noted above, constructive discrimination is the type of discrimination in
which an adverse effect on a protected group is caused by an action or policy
that does not expressly distinguish on impermissible grounds. This type of
discrimination manifests itself by its effect, rather than by differentiation on
prohibited grounds. An example is a requirement by an employer that all
employees work on Saturdays. Such a requirement, applied to everyone, disadvantages persons whose religious obligations fall on Saturdays, and thus can
constitute religious discrimination. Constructive discrimination has been accepted as part of the definition of discrimination for the purpose of the Charter,
as well as under human rights legislation.
Constructive discrimination was first dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada
in the context of human rights legislation, in O'Malley v. Simpson-Sears.74 In
that case, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that, despite the absence of
specific legislative wording, discrimination cannot be confined to situations in
which a protected group is singled out for different treatment. O'Malley involved a challenge to an employer's "seemingly neutral" rule that obliged
workers to accept Saturday employment. The Court found the rule discriminatory because of its adverse effect on Sabbatarians, despite the fact that the effect
had not been contemplated by the employer. The "adverse effect" doctrine was
thus developed as an extension of the debate about whether a person who
72.
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unwittingly effects a discriminatory result should be considered liable for
discrimination. However, since the O'Malley decision the Supreme Court of
Canada has confirmed that, even in cases of discriminatory differentiation, proof
of discriminatory intent is not required because the purpose of human rights
75
legislation is remedial.
The idea that identical treatment applied to everyone can have discriminatory
effects was first accepted for the purpose of discrimination analysis under the
Charterin Andrews, although Andrews did not involve identical treatment. The
only constructive discrimination judgements of the Supreme Court in the
context of the Charterhave been Symes and Rodriguez.
The matter at issue in Symes 76 was a provision of the Income Tax Act that
effectively disallowed wages paid to a nanny as a business expense. Ms. Symes,
a self-employed lawyer, argued that the provision was constructively discriminatory against business women. Ultimately, the majority of Supreme Court of
Canada ruled that s.15 had not been breached, although they accepted that
"adverse effects" discrimination was covered by s.15. 77 Justice Iacobucci, for
the majority, noted that:
... it is clear that a law may be discriminatory even if it is not directly or expressly discriminatory. In other words, adverse effects discrimination is
comprehended by s.15(1).78
The matter at issue in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.) 79 was a provision
of the Criminal Code that effectively made assisting in suicide a crime. Ms.
Rodriguez argued that disabled persons who are unable to commit suicide
without assistance are discriminated against contrary to s. 15 in that, unlike
persons capable of causing their own deaths, they are deprived of the option of
choosing suicide by virtue of s. 241(b) of the CriminalCode.
The majority of the Court refused to deal with the s. 15 issue, assuming without
deciding that s. 15 was infringed, and holding that the impugned provision of the
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Criminal Code was protected by s. 1 in any event. The Chief Justice agreed that
s. 15 was breached, and held that the provision was not saved by s. 1.
The Chief Justice, in his judgement in Rodriguez, addressed the determination
of "whether (an) inequality is discriminatory":
... it must first be determined whether the effect of that provision is to impose on certain persons or groups of persons a disadvantage or burden or to
deprive them of an advantage, benefit and so on. It must then be determined
whether that deprivation is imposed by or by the effect of a personal characteristic listed in s. 15(1) of the Charter, or a similar characteristic. 80
The Chief Justice went on to summarize the positive duty on government as
follows:
Not only does s. 15(1) require the government to exercise greater caution in
making express or direct distinctions based on personal characteristics, but
legislation equally applicable to everyone is also capable of infringing the
right to equality enshrined in that provision, and so of having to be justified
in terms of s. 1. Even in imposing generally applicable provisions, the government must take into account differences which in fact exist between individuals and so far as possible ensure that the provisions adopted will not
have a greater impact on certain classes of persons due to irrelevant personal characteristics than on the public as a whole. In other words, to promote the objective of the more equal society, s. 15(1) acts as a bar to the
executive enacting provisions without taking into account their possible im81
pact on already disadvantaged classes of persons.
There have been a number of constructive discrimination judgements by the
Supreme Court under human rights legislation. They include Brossardv. Comm.
des droits de la personne,82 Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Human Rights
Commission (Alta.),83 Renaud v. Board of Education of Central Okanagan No.
23 and C.U.P.E. Local 523.84 In all of these, the equity-seeker was successful,
and the judgements are presumably reliable indicators about how the Supreme
Court would view similar issues arising under s. 15.
A major difficulty that arises from the underdeveloped state of the law in this
area is that judges often fail to recognise the indirect nature of the causal link in
constructive discrimination. This problem is illustrated in Fernandesv. Director
80.
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of Social Services (Winnipeg Central),85 and in Eldridge v. British Columbia.
Both cases are discussed below.

1.

Judicial reluctance to recognise constructive discrimination in
benefits cases
In Fernandes, the appellant had a progressive disease requiring full-time care.
He had to move from an apartment into a hospital after his spousal relationship
broke up. It was accepted on the evidence that he did not need to remain in
hospital, since he was able to reside in ordinary accommodation if he could
obtain 16 hours per day of attendant care. He applied under Manitoba's Social
Allowances Act8 7 (hereinafter the SAA) for the funds that would allow him to
live independently. A provision of the SAA allowed for an allowance for
"essential surgical, medical ... and other remedial treatment, care and attention".
However, the SAA also allowed the Director, in making a decision to grant an
allowance, to take into account any "resources" that might be available to the
applicant. The Director took into account the availability of the hospital to the
applicant, and refused to grant Fernandes an allowance.
The Director's decision was confirmed by the administrative tribunal set up to
deal with appeals under the SAA. Fernandes appealed the decision, citing, inter
alia, ss.7 and 15 of the Charter.He was unsuccessful.
The Manitoba Court of Appeal accepted that the SAA allowed the interpretation
taken by the Director, but found that s.15 was not infringed. The Court found
that the appellant was not being disadvantaged because of any personal characteristic. The Court observed:
Under the Act, Femandes is being treated in the same manner as all applicants for an allowance. He is receiving all basic necessities as required by
the Act ... The fact that he is not being housed in a facility of his choice
does not give rise to a determination that he is deprived of equal protection
and benefit before and under the law.
... He is unable to remain community-based because he has no caregiver,
because he must rely upon public assistance and because the facilities available to meet his needs are limited. 88
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal.
85.
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The day after the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in Egan, Miron, and
Thibaudeau, the British Columbia Court of Appeal decided Eldridge v. British
Columbia.89 The judgement of the majority in Eldridge is depressingly similar
to that in Fernandes.
The three plaintiffs in Eldridge were born deaf. They are fluent users of
American Sign Language, but have limited skills in written English and none in
spoken English. The problem at issue in Eldridge was the failure of the British
Columbia health insurance scheme to pay for sign language interpretation for
deaf beneficiaries. The plaintiffs, who included a diabetic whose diabetes was
not easily controlled and a woman who had experienced the premature birth of
twins without being able to communicate with the medical personnel involved,
provided compelling evidence as to the need for clear communication between
health workers and patients. However, two out of three members of the B.C.
Court of Appeal concluded that there had been no breach of s. 15.
There appear to be two reasons for the majority decision. The first is that:
...the evidence before us falls well short of establishing that because of
their hearing impairment, for all practical purposes, the deaf are denied the
medical services available to the hearing. 90
This finding was apparently occasioned by the fact that one set of plaintiffs had
access to a doctor who could communicate in American Sign Language, and by
the testimony of a doctor who was communicated with his patients by written
notes that:
"I think I give adequate care. I would like to give better care." 9 1
The majority's analysis of s. 15 is even more disturbing than its analysis of the
evidence. The Court begins by noting that:
In establishing the impact of the legislation there must be a distinction
drawn between those effects which can be attributed to the legislation and
those which exist independently of it.92
It goes on to say:
...
The legislation removes the responsibility of both the hearing and the
deaf to make payment to their doctors. This is the impact of the legislation
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on both the deaf and the hearing. Therefore, the effect of the legislation is
that the deaf remain responsible for the payment of translators in order to
receive equivalent medical services as those with hearing, as they would be
in the absence of the legislation. This inequality exists independently of the
legislation and cannot be said in any way to be an effect of the legislation.
Both purposively and effectively the legislation provides its benefit of mak93
ing payment for medical services equally to the hearing and the deaf.
Lambert J., who dissented from the majority view of s. 15 in Eldridge, accepted
that the exclusion of interpreter services breached s.15, but held that the
discrimination was justified under s.1.
The approach taken by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Fernandesis essentially
to ignore the part played by social assistance in the plaintiff's enforced confinement to hospital, and instead to cast about for a "cause" of the plaintiff's
predicament that does not require Charter scrutiny. The Court failed to appreciate that the Director's interpretation of "resources" to include a hospital meant
that people with severe disabilities were denied the opportunity to choose a
residence outside a hospital. 94 A comparable decision in respect of able-bodied
people would be a decision that, if shelters for the homeless were available,
people should be denied a housing allowance.
The majority of the B.C. Court of Appeal in Eldridge placed a further refinement
on the Fernandesapproach by choosing the narrowest possible definition of the
purpose of the health insurance legislation at issue, contrary to the usual
principles of statutory interpretation. 95 The purpose of the legislation, according
to the Court, was not to make the included health services available, it was to
"remove the responsibility to make payment". By using this device, the court
was able to locate the plaintiff's burden outside the ambit of the legislation.
Dianne Pothier, in an article soon to be published in the CanadianJournal of
ConstitutionalLaw96 sums this up neatly:
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In other words, the Court is saying that since the state did not cause the disability, it has no responsibility in relation thereto. It makes one wonder
what was the point of including disability within the protection of s. 15.

When the situations in Fernandesand Eldridge are compared with the situation
in Rodriguez, it is clear that the Courts of Appeal of Manitoba and British
Columbia did not approach the facts as the Supreme Court would do. If the Chief
Justice had used the Fernandesand Eldridge approach, he would have decided
that the "real" reasons for Ms. Rodriguez's problem were the fact that she was
disabled and the fact that she could not persuade someone else to risk a criminal
prosecution, and that therefore there was no discrimination. Instead, he was
willing to give consideration to how the application of the impugned law made
a bad situation worse.
Fernandeswas decided before the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez. Eldridge
was decided after Rodriguez, and in the light of the Chief Justice's judgement
in Rodriguez, Eldridge was clearly wrongly decided.
The Fernandesdecision is very short on legal analysis, so it is difficult to discern
why the Court took the approach it did. As with the lower court Egan and Mcleod
judgements reviewed above, the approach of the Court may reflect no more than
a reluctance to acknowledge that giving substantive effect to the equality rights
granted in the Chartermeans that change to existing systems must be contemplated. The same reluctance was much more evident in the Eldridge decision,
which is considerably longer. That reluctance cannot be fully addressed by mere
legal argument. However, the advocate can address the point at which these
decisions diverge from the direction taken by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez.
That argument is discussed below.
2. Rebutting predictable arguments in constructive discrimination cases
All of the "predictable arguments" noted above in the section on discriminatory
differentiation might be made in constructive discrimination cases, and can be
rebutted as outlined above. The other argument that most often greets constructive discrimination cases is the one that appears to underlie the reasoning of the
Manitoba and British Columbia Courts of Appeal in Fernandes and Eldridge,
above. The argument is not stated in the decisions, but it can be inferred to be
something like the following:
a)
S. 15 protection is limited to situations in which the government's act or
omission can be seen as the only cause of the applicant'shardship.
The Fernandes and Eldridge Courts' narrow focus with causation might be
caused by overreliance on some of the wording of the Andrews decision. An
argument can be made, supported by the judgement of Lamer C.J.C. in
Rodriguez, and by the judgements in Egan, Miron, and Thibaudeau, that the
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court cannot avoid examining the impact of impugned legislation or government
action simply because they are not the only reasons for the applicant's hardship.
Rodriguez is the only decision of the Supreme Court of Canada which has dealt
with constructive discrimination on the ground of disability under s.15. In
Rodriguez, the majority of the Court declined to deal with the s.15 issue,
assuming without deciding that s.15 was infringed, and holding that the impugned provision of the Criminal Code was protected by s. 1 in any event.
The majority of the Court having avoided the issue, the decision of the Chief
Justice (dissenting only in respect of the application of s. 1)stands as the only
indication available as to how the Supreme Court would analyse an argument
like the one above.
The Chief Justice concluded that disabled persons who are unable to commit
suicide without assistance are discriminated against contrary to s. 15 in that,
unlike persons capable of causing their own deaths, they are deprived of the
option of choosing suicide by virtue of s. 24 1(b) of the Criminal Code. They are
deprived of a benefit or subjected to a burden. He further found that s. 1 of the
Charter does not save s. 241(b) of the Criminal Code:
...
I find that an absolute prohibition that is indifferent to the individual or
the circumstances in question cannot satisfy the constitutional duty on the
government to impair the rights of persons with physical disabilities as little
as reasonably possible. Section 241(b) cannot survive the minimal impairment component of the proportionality test ...97
The Chief Justice addressed the causation issue in constructive discrimination
cases as follows:
In Andrews, supra, McIntyre, J., stated that the first characteristic of discrimination is that it is "a distinction ...
based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group" (p. 174). Can it be said that
the distinction here is "based" on grounds relating to a personal characteristic covered by s. 15(1)? In my view, if s. 15(1) is to be applied to adverse
effect discrimination, as McIntyre, J., implies, the definition given in Andrews should not be taken too literally. I adopt in this regard the observations of Linden, J.A., who said in dissent in Egan and Nesbit v. Canada
(1993), 153 N.R. 161, at p. 196:
"While a distinction must be based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group in order to be discriminatory, the
words "based on" do not mean that the distinction must be designed with
reference to those grounds. Rather, the relevant consideration is whether
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the distinction affects the individual or group in a manner related to their
personal characteristics."
In other words, the difference in treatment must be closely related to the
personal characteristic of the person or group of persons. In the case at bar,
there can be no doubt as to the existence of such a connection. It is only on
account of their physical disability that persons unable to commit suicide
unassisted are unequally affected by s. 241(b) of the Criminal Code. The
distinction is therefore unquestionably "based" on this personal characteristic. Is it a characteristic covered by s. 15(l)?
A physical disability is among the personal characteristics listed in s. 15(1)
of the Charter. There is therefore no need to consider at length the connection between the ground of distinction at issue here and the general purpose
of s. 15, namely elimination of discrimination against groups who are victims of stereotypes, disadvantages or prejudices. No one would seriously
question the fact that persons with disabilities are the subject of unfavourable treatment in Canadian society, a fact confirmed by the presence of this
personal characteristic on the list of unlawful grounds of this discrimination
given in s. 15(1) of the Charter.
I accept that s. 241(b) was never intended to create such an inequality, and
that provision, which contains no distinction based on personal characteristics, does at first sight treat all individuals in the same way. For the reasons
given above, however, saying this does not dispose of the argument that the
provision creates inequality. Even if this was not the legislature's intent, and although s. 241(b) does not contain any provision specifically applicable to persons with disabilities, the fact remains that such persons, those who are or will
become incapable of committing suicide unassisted, are on account of their dis98
ability affected by s. 241(b) of the Criminal Code differently from others.
The Chief Justice restated the Andrews definition of discrimination as follows:
To determine whether the inequality created by s. 241(b) of the Criminal
Code is discriminatory, it must first be determined whether the effect of that
provision is to impose on certain persons or groups of persons a disadvantage or burden or to deprive them of an advantage, benefit and so on. It
must then be determined whether that deprivation is imposed by or by the
effect of a personal characteristic listed in s. 15(1) of the Charter, or a similar characteristic. (emphasis added) 99

Not surprisingly, since there have been only two constructive discrimination
decisions based on s. 15 by the Supreme Court of Canada to date, (Symes and
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between discriminatory differentiation and constructive discrimination, other
than in Rodriguez as noted above. However, the contributions to the definition
of discrimination made by the majority of the Supreme Court in Egan, Miron,
and Thibaudeau (reviewed above in the section on discriminatory differentiation) show a willingness to recognise discrimination from the perspective of the
equity-seeker, without undue restriction in regard to causation.
IV. THE GROUNDS OF DISCRIMINATION
The grounds enumerated in s.15 are "race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability". Being able to classify the
client as part of an enumerated group obviously relieves the advocate of one of
the headaches of Charterlitigation. However, people have a messy habit of
being multi-faceted and hard to classify. Frequently, the most accurate description of the group affected is not included among the enumerated grounds.
Counsel must then argue for inclusion of the named group as an unenumerated
group.
Particular problems can be created by the legislation or government action. In
many situations, not all persons who could be affected by the legislation or
government action are members of the groups on whose behalf the litigation is
commenced. In other situations, not all members of groups cited are affected by
the legislation or government action.
Judicial comment on all of these issues is presented below.
A.

Obtaining inclusion as an "unenumeratedground"

1.
The pre-Egan, Thibaudeau, and Miron approach
In Andrews,00 Justice McIntyre found that an "enumerated and analogous
grounds" approach to section 15 was most closely in accord with the purposes
of the section and the definition of discrimination. This approach asserts that
the purpose of the section is to prevent discrimination based on the grounds
enumerated and on grounds analogous to them. While McIntyre J stated that the
grounds enumerated in section 15(1) must receive particular attention because
they " ... reflect the most common and probably the most socially destructive
and historically practised bases of discrimination", he emphasized that the
grounds listed in section 15 are not exclusive and that other possible grounds
may be established. 10 1
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Justice McIntyre's judgement in Andrews briefly mentioned, with approval, US
caselaw which established constitutional protection of a group on the basis of
10 2
that group being "a discrete and insular minority".
In R. v. Turpin, Siddiqui and Clauzel,10 3 the Supreme Court of Canada again
had occasion to consider non-enumerated grounds, this time in the context of a
claim that s. 15 should forbid different treatment of accused persons based on
the province in which they were tried. Justice Wilson noted that the indicia of
discrimination include stereotyping, historical disadvantage or vulnerability to
political and social prejudice. The decision in Turpin also contains a reminder
that the decision to include of a group under the protection of s. 15 should be
with a view to the purpose of s.15, which is to remedy or prevent discrimination
"against groups suffering social, political and legal disadvantage in our society". 104
The reason for the Court's unanimous decision that s. 15 was not breached
finally appeared to be that persons accused of crimes in all provinces except
Alberta could not be said to be members of a "discrete and insular minority".
Prior to the release of the Supreme Court's decisions in Egan, Miron and
Thibaudeau, it appeared that the courts were developing a situation-specific
approach to determining whether an unenumerated ground of discrimination
was to be included for the purposes of s.15. In Schachtschneiderv. M.N.R.,0 5
the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal found that a tax provision which
was disadvantageous to the applicant because she was married and living with
her spouse did not discriminate because of marital status. Mahoney J.A., for the
majority, stated:
[T]he group now in issue is composed of married persons with a child of
the marriage, living together and not supporting each other. In my opinion,
that is not a group that can be described as being disadvantaged in the context of its place in the entire social, political and legal fabric of our society.
It follows that it is not a distinct and insular minority within the contemplation of s. 15.106
In the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Thibaudeau, the context produced a
different result. As noted above, the appellant was a divorced mother with
custody of her two children, who challenged the tax treatment of maintenance
payments. Under the current tax laws, maintenance payments are added to the
102. Ibid. at 24.
103. Supra, note 21.
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recipient spouse's income and are deducted from the payor spouse's income.
The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal struck down s. 56(1)(b), the
inclusion provision, as discriminatory, contrary to s. 15(1) of the Charter,on
the basis of "family status". The court observed that separated custodial parents
could readily be seen as "a discrete and insular minority which has historically
107
suffered prejudice and has need of protection".
2. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's critique of grounds-based approach
The prominent place granted in the jurisprudence to the "ground of discrimination" question, coupled with the judicial tendency toward having inclusion as
an unenumerated ground depend on the circumstances of the case, creates the
potential for massive uncertainty in Charterlitigation. This fact was not lost on
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, and it was a major reason for her proposal of a new
approach to s.15 analysis in Egan. Clearly, Justice L'Heureux-Dubd has expressed a willingness to focus on the situation of the actual equity-seeking
group, without much inquiry into the characteristics of the ground. Although
hers is the view of only one member of the Court (albeit its most advanced and
sophisticated equity analyst) it has obviously influenced other members. While
Justices McLachlin, Sopinka, Cory and Iacobucci have for now continued with
the "grounds" analysis, it is clear that they are prepared to be liberal in their
approach to unenumerated grounds. It seems likely that over time the distinctions in approach among the majority of the Court could blur significantly.
Because it appears to be influencing a majority position, and because of its
strong relevance to the facts in many government-benefit Chartercases, Justice
L'Heureux-Dubd's approach is set out here in some detail. It is followed by the
more broadly-based views of the majority:
... the current vehicle of choice for fulfilling the purposes of s. 15, the
"grounds" approach, is incapable of giving full effect to this purpose ...
... This approach inquires into whether the characteristics of the ground are
sufficient to constitute a basis for discrimination, rather than into the absence or presence of discriminatory effects themselves ... We must remember that the grounds in s. 15, enumerated and analogous, are instruments for
finding discrimination. They are a means to an end. By focusing almost entirely on the nature, content and context of the disputed ground, however,
we have begun to approach it as an end, in and of itself. Such an approach,
in effect, approaches s. 15 not by giving primacy to the word "discrimination", but rather by giving primacy to the nine enumerated grounds. In essence, it defines the preconditions to when discrimination will be present
exclusively by reference to qualities seen generally to reside in those
grounds.
107. Thibaudeau v. Canada(M.N.R.) (1994), 167 N.R. 161 (F.C.A.) at 184.
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Additional problems arise when certain grounds, particularly grounds based
upon legal status (marital status, family status, citizenship, province of residence, etc.) may be said to give rise to discriminatory concerns in certain
contexts but not in others. Are these grounds therefore sometimes analogous and sometimes not analogous? In these types of circumstances, the
finding of "analogousness" will be driven by the result we want to reach. If
we want to conclude that the impugned distinction is discriminatory, then
we find the grounds to be analogous. If we want to conclude that a distinction is non-discriminatory, then we simply say that although the ground
"may be analogous in some contexts", it is not in this case: see, e.g., Turpin,
supra, per Wilson J.; R. v. Gntreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, per Lamer C.J.
... If a finding of discrimination does not flow automatically from a finding
that a distinction has been drawn on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground (see Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General), [ 1993] 2 S.C.R.
872; R. v. Hess, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906), then it follows that reliance on
"grounds" may not contemplate the entire picture. An additional dimension
of analysis is needed.
At this juncture, an important question must be asked. If the purpose of s.
15 is really to provide a broad guarantee of protection against discrimination in all of its forms, then why does it matter if the basis for distinction is
abstractly "analogous" to the enumerated categories? The answer, I think, is
that it does not matter. As this Court has frequently acknowledged, the essence of discrimination is its impact, not its intention. The enumerated or
analogous nature of a given ground should not be a necessary precondition to a finding of discrimination. If anything, a finding of discrimination is a precondition to the recognition of an analogous ground. The effect
of the "enumerated or analogous grounds" approach may be to narrow the
ambit of s. 15, and to encourage too much analysis at the wrong level.
We will never address the problem of discrimination completely, or ferret it
out in all its forms, if we continue to focus on abstract categories and generalizations rather than on specific effects. By looking at the grounds for the
distinction instead of at the impact of the distinction on particular groups,
we risk undertaking an analysis that is distanced and desensitized from real
people's real experiences. To make matters worse, in defining the appropriate categories upon which findings of discrimination may be based, we risk
relying on conventions and stereotypes about individuals within these categories that, themselves, further entrench a discriminatory status quo. More
often than not, disadvantage arises from the way in which society treats particular individuals, rather than from any characteristic inherent in those individuals.
For all of these reasons, I am led inevitably to the conclusion that a truly purposive approach to s. 15 must place "discrimination" first and foremost in the
Court's analysis. This is not to say that the essential characteristics of the nine
enumerated grounds are irrelevant to our inquiry. They are, in fact, highly relevant. I turn now to a discussion of their important role in an approach that looks
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to groups rather than grounds, and discriminatory impact rather than discriminatory potential. (emphasis added) 10 8
She noted that "an effects-based approach to s. 15 that looks to groups rather
than grounds recognizes the importance of adverse effects discrimination in s.
15 without requiring us to resolve some of the intractable issues that have sprung
up around that doctrine" such as the question of what percentage of the affected
population must be identified by an enumerated or unenumerated ground of
discrimination, in order for s.15 to come into play:
To expand briefly upon the example of domestic workers, under traditional adverse effects doctrine, what percentage of the group would have to have been
women in order to succeed in a sex-based discrimination claim? Fifty percent?
Ninety percent? As this Court found in Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, it is
difficult to draw a principled distinction along such lines. I believe that it is both easier and more intellectually honest to examine the effect of the distinction on the
group affected. In this case, that group would be domestic workers, and the only decision is: does the distinction discriminate against domestic workers?
As I noted in Canada (Attomey General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 at p.
645, categories of discrimination cannot be reduced to watertight compartments,
but rather will often overlap in significant measure. When assessing the social
context of the impugned distinction, it is therefore of relevance that a significant
majority of domestic workers are immigrant women, a subgroup that has historically been both exploited and marginalized in our society. Awareness of, and
sensitivity to, the realities of those experiencing the distinction is an important
task that judges must undertake when evaluating the impact of the distinction on
members of the affected group. Discrimination cannot be fully appreciated or
addressed unless courts' analysis focuses directly on the issue of whether these
workers are victims of discrimination, rather than becoming distracted by ancillary issues such as "grounds", be they enumerated or analogous. 109
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's discussion of the need for both subjectivity and
objectivity in defining discrimination (outlined above in Part II) yields some
useful direction as to how she would approach the decision as to whether a
particular group is entitled to Charterprotection. She would look at both the
nature of the group, and the seriousness of the disadvantage at issue:
... groups that are more socially vulnerable will experience the adverse effects of a legislative distinction more vividly than if the same distinction
were directed at a group which is not similarly socially vulnerable. As such,
a distinction may be discriminatory in its impact upon one group yet not
discriminatory in its impact upon another group. While it may be discriminatory against women to prohibit female guards from searching male prisoners, it may not be discriminatory against men to prohibit male guards

108. Egan, supra, note 2 at para 46-54.
109. Ibid. at para 79-80.
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from searching female prisoners: Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General),
supra. While it may be discriminatory to define a particular criminal offence as only applying to women, it may not be discriminatory to restrict
the applicability of the offence of sexual assault of a minor to men: R. v.
Hess, supra. In the same way that it does not really matter why the affected
surface is soft, it is not necessary that there be a formal nexus between the
social vulnerability of the affected group and the prejudice flowing from the
impugned distinction in order for that vulnerability to be relevant to determining whether the distinction is discriminatory. Put another way, it is
merely admitting reality to acknowledge that members of advantaged
groups are generally less sensitive to, and less likely to experience, discrimination than members of disadvantaged, socially vulnerable or marginalized
groups. See, by analogy, Schachtschneider v. Canada, [1994] 1 F.C. 40
(C.A.), per Linden J.A..
Most of the factors identified in Andrews under the "analogous -rounds"
approach as characteristic of the enumerated grounds in s. 15 are, not surprisingly, integral to evaluating the nature of the group affected by the impugned distinction. It is highly relevant, for instance, to inquire into
whether the impugned distinction is based upon fundamental attributes,
such as those enumerated in s. 15, that are generally considered to be essential
to our popular conception of 'personhood' or 'humanness'. Furthermore, it is
important to ask ourselves questions such as "Is the adversely affected group
already a victim of historical disadvantage?"; "Is this distinction reasonably
capable of aggravating or perpetuating that disadvantage?"; "Are group
members currently socially vulnerable to stereotyping, social prejudice
and/or marginalization?"; and "Does this distinction expose them to the reasonable possibility of future social vulnerability to stereotyping, social prejudice
and/or marginalization?". Membership in a "discrete and insular minority",
lacking in political power and thus susceptible to having its interests overlooked, is yet another consideration that may be taken into account.
Consideration of these factors involves the recognition that differently situated groups are starting on different levels of the s. 15 playing field. In my
view, our approach to s. 15 must reflect that reality. Indeed, I reiterate McIntyre J.'s words in Andrews, supra, at p. 169 that "for the accommodation
of differences, which is the essence of true equality, it will frequently be
necessary to make distinctions". Treating historically vulnerable, disadvantaged or marginalized groups in the same manner as groups which do not
generally suffer from such vulnerability may not accommodate, or even
contemplate, those differences. In fact, ignoring such differences may compound them, by making access to s. 15 relief most difficult for those groups
that are the most disempowered of all in Canadian society.
To summarize, the more socially vulnerable the affected group and the
more fundamental to our popular conception of "personhood" the character-
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istic which forms the basis for the distinction, the more likely that this distinction will be discriminatory.

In the same way that a very dense projectile will impact upon a surface
more sharply than a less dense projectile, an examination of the nature of
the interest affected by the impugned distinction is helpful in determining
whether that distinction is discriminatory. This examination requires an
evaluation of both economic and non-economic elements.
As I noted earlier, the Charter is not a document of economic rights and
freedoms. Rather, it only protects "economic rights" when such protection
is necessarily incidental to protection of the worth and dignity of the human
person (i.e. necessary to the protection of a "human right"). Nonetheless,
the nature, quantum and context of an economic prejudice or denial of such
a benefit are important factors in determining whether the distinction from
which the differing economic consequences flow is one which is discriminatory. If all other things are equal, the more severe and localized the economic consequences on the affected group, the more likely that the
distinction responsible for these consequences is discriminatory within the
meaning of s. 15 of the Charter.

Referring back to our analogy once again, if the projectile is dense enough
and thrown hard enough, then it will leave a mark on even the most resilient
of surfaces. Similarly, the more fundamental the interest affected or the
more serious the consequences of the distinction, the more likely that the
impugned distinction will have a discriminatory impact even with respect to
groups that occupy a position of advantage in society.
To summarize, tangible economic consequences are but one manifestation of the
more intangible and invidious harms flowing from discrimination, which the
Charter seeks to root out. In other cases, the prejudice will be to an important individual interest rather than to one that is economic in nature. The nature of the
interest affected is therefore highly relevant to whether the distinction that adversely affects that interest is discriminatory in nature. In all but the most extreme cases, this factor cannot be considered in isolation. It only assumes
meaningful proportions when assessed in light of the nature of the group affected.I 10
3.
The probability of a more inclusive approach to unenumerated grounds
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 has expressed most clearly the willingness to focus on
the situation of the actual equity-seeking group, without much inquiry into the
characteristics of the ground. However, as noted above, the rest of the majority
of the Court have maintained a liberal approach which has produced the same
results as the approach of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6.

110. Ibid. at para 58-66.
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Justice McLachlin (for Sopinka, Cory, and Iacobucci) in Miron:
Our approach must be generous, reflecting the "continuing framework" of the
constitution and the need for "'the unremitting protection' of equality rights":
Andrews, per McIntyre J., at p. 175. Andrews instructs us that our approach
must also reflect the human rights background against which the Charter was
adopted. In evoking human rights law as the defining characteristic of discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter, this Court in Andrews engaged the principle of equality which underlies the constitutions of free and democratic
countries throughout the world. This principle recognizes the dignity of each
human being and each person's freedom to develop his body and spirit as he or
she desires, subject to such limitations as may be justified by the interests of the
community as a whole. It recognizes that society is based on individuals who
are different from each other, and that a free and democratic society must accommodate and respect these differences. Logic suggests that in determining
whether a particular group characteristic is an analogous ground, the fundamental consideration is whether the characteristic may serve as an irrelevant basis of
exclusion and a denial of essential human dignity in the human rights tradition.
In other words, may it serve as a basis for unequal treatment based on stereotypical attributes ascribed to the group, rather than on the true worth and ability or
circumstances of the individual? An affirmative answer to this question indicates that the characteristic may be used in a manner which is violative of
human dignity and freedom.
The theme of violation of human dignity and freedom by imposing limitations and disadvantages on the basis of a stereotypical attribution of group
characteristics rather than on the basis of individual capacity, worth or circumstance is reflected in qualities which judges have found to be associated
with analogous grounds. One indicator of an analogous ground may be that
the targeted group has suffered historical disadvantage, independent of the
challenged distinction: Andrews, supra, at p. 152 per Wilson J.; Turpin,
supra, at pp. 1331-32. Another may be the fact that the group constitutes a
"discrete and insular minority": Andrews, supra, at p. 152 per Wilson J. and
at p. 183 per McIntyre J.; Turpin, supra, at p. 1333. Another indicator is a
distinction made on the basis of a personal characteristic; as McIntyre J.
stated in Andrews, "[d]istinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will
rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an
individual's merits and capacities will rarely be so classed" (at pp. 174-75).
By extension, it has been suggested that distinctions based on personal and
immutable characteristics must be discriminatory within s. 15(1): Andrews,
supra, at 195 per La Forest J. Additional assistance may be obtained by
comparing the ground at issue with the grounds enumerated, or from recognition by legislators and jurists that the ground is discriminatory: see Egan
v. Canada, supra, per Cory J.
All of these may be valid indicators in the inclusionary sense that their presence
may signal an analogous ground. But the converse proposition - that any or
all of them must be present to find an analogous ground - is invalid. As
Wilson J. recognized in Turpin (at p. 1333), they are but "analytical tools"
which may be "of assistance". For example, analogous grounds cannot be con-
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fined to historically disadvantaged groups; if the Charter is to remain relevant to
future generations, it must retain a capacity to recognize new grounds of discrimination. Nor is it essential that the analogous ground target a discrete and
insular minority; this is belied by the inclusion of sex as a ground enumerated in
s. 15(1). And while discriminatory group markers often involve immutable characteristics, they do not necessarily do so. Religion, an enumerated ground, is not
immutable. Nor is citizenship, recognized in Andrews; nor province of residence, considered in Turpin. All these and more may be indicators of analogous
grounds, but the unifying principle is larger: the avoidance of stereotypical reasoning and the creation of legal distinctions which violate the dignity and freedom of the individual, on the basis of some preconceived perception about the
attributed characteristics of a group rather than the true capacity, worth or circumstances of the individual. (emphasis added) 11
Justice Cory (for lacobucci, McLachlin, and Sopinka) in Egan:
The fundamental consideration underlying the analogous grounds analysis
is whether the basis of distinction may serve to deny the essential human
112
dignity of the Charter claimant.
The decisions of Justice McLachlin (for Sopinka, Cory, and Iacobucci) inMiron,
and Justice Cory (for Iacobucci, McLachlin, and Sopinka) in Egan list the
following reasons for including, respectively, marital status and sexual orientation as unenumerated grounds:
.

personal characteristic

"it touches the individual's freedom to live life with the mate of one's
choice in the fashion of one's choice ...
a matter of defining importance to individuals ...not a matter which should be excluded from Charter consideration
113
on the ground that its recognition would trivialize the equality guarantee.
...
the question is whether the difference in treatment is closely related to a
114
personal characteristic of a group to which the claimant belongs.
* historical disadvantage:
marital status possesses characteristics often associated with recognized
grounds of discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter... Persons involved
in an unmarried relationship constitute an historically disadvantaged group.
There is ample evidence that unmarried partners have often suffered social
115
disadvantage and prejudice.
111. Miron, supra, note4atpara 145-149.
112. Supra, note2atpara 171.
113. Miron, supra, note 4 at para 15 1.
114. Egan, supra, note 2 at para 167.
115. Miron, supra, note 4 at para 152.
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While historical disadvantage or a group's position as a discrete and insular
minority may serve as indicators of an analogous ground, they are not prerequisites for finding an analogous ground. They may simply be of assistance in determining whether the interest advanced by a claimant is the sort
of interest that s. 15(1) was designed to protect. The fundamental consideration underlying the analogous grounds analysis is whether the basis of distinction may serve to deny the essential human dignity of the Charter
claimant. Since one of the aims of s. 15(1) is to prevent discrimination
against groups which suffer from a social or political disadvantage it follows that it may be helpful to see if there is any indication that the group in
question has suffered discrimination arising from stereotyping, historical
disadvantage or vulnerability to political and social prejudice. 116
The historic disadvantage suffered by homosexual persons has been widely
recognized and documented. Public harassment and verbal abuse of homosexual individuals is not uncommon. Homosexual women and men have
been the victims of crimes of violence directed at them specifically because
of their sexual orientation. 117
0 individual's lack of full control over characteristic
marital status often lies beyond the individual's effective control ... the individual exercises limited but not exclusive control over the designation. 118
* legislative/judicial recognition:
legislators and jurists throughout our country have recognized that distinguishing between cohabiting couples on the basis of whether they are legally married or not fails to accord with current social values or realities. 119
... it is apparent that a legislative consensus is emerging which recognizes
that sexual orientation is an analogous and prohibited ground of discrimination. The human rights legislation in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Quebec,
Ontario, Manitoba and the Yukon all prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. As a result of Charter challenges, protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is also available in Alberta and in the
federal jurisdiction. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Haig v. Canada, supra,
found that sexual orientation was an analogous ground ... 120

116. Egan, supra,note 2 at para 171.
117. Ibid. atpara 173.
118. Miron, supra,note 4 at para 153.
119. Ibid. atpara 155.

120. Egan, supra, note 2 at para 176-77.
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4.
Use of International Law
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that international human rights
treaty obligations entered into by Canada and decisions of international human
rights tribunals may be of value in interpreting the Charter. In Reference Re
Public Service Employee Relations Act, Labour Relations Act and Police Officers Collective BargainingAct, 12 1 Chief Justice Dickson (in dissent but not on
this point) stated that, although the norms of international law were not binding,
they provided "a relevant and persuasive source for interpretation" of Charter
provisions, especially when arising out of Canada's international human rights
obligations. Dickson C.J.C. held that:
... the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least
as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights
122
documents which Canada has ratified.
In Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson,123 Dickson C.J.C. (now in the
majority) indicated that Canada's international human rights obligations should
inform:
... not only the interpretation of the content of the rights guaranteed by the
Charter but also the interpretation of what can constitute pressing and substantial s. 1 objectives which may justify restrictions upon those rights. Furthermore, for purposes of this stage of the proportionality inquiry, the fact
that a value has the status of an international human right, either in customary international law or under a treaty to which Canada is a state party,
should generally be indicative of a high degree of importance attached to
124
that objective.
B.
Rebutting predictablearguments concerninggrounds
Once one has determined the big issue of whether an unenumerated group
"qualifies" for Charter protection, the reach of the impugned legislation or
government action is the main issue that gives rise to arguments about grounds
of discrimination. One common argument is that, if the legislation or government action affects persons other than the groups on whose behalf the litigation
is undertaken, there is no breach of s. 15. The opposite proposition is also argued:
if not all members of groups cited are affected by the impugned legislation or
government action, there is no breach of s. 15.

121. (1987), 38 D.L.R (4th) 161 (S.C.C.).
122. Ibid. at 185.
123. (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th)416 (S.C.C.).
124. Ibid. at 427-8.
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Obviously, if the approach suggested by Justice L'Heureux-Dub6' were universally accepted, none of the arguments noted below would arise. The first
question would not be about whether the persons affected by the legislation or
government action could be classified in such a way as to qualify for Charter
protection, but about whether the disadvantage created by the legislation or
government action was discriminatory. We would not run the risk of "denying
s. 15 relief to persons who are victims of legislatively sanctioned discrimination,
but who are unable to fit themselves into an established or analogous
'ground'. 1 25 While the entire Supreme Court has yet to specifically embrace
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's approach, the analyses retained by Justices Lamer,
Cory, Iacobucci, McLachlin, and Sopinka provide considerable support in
rebutting the arguments noted above.
1)

not all persons who could be affected by the Regulation are members
of the groups we cite as affected
As a matter of logic, there would seem to be no justification to refuse a claim
of discrimination by one group because others could also be subject to discrimination. In Egan, Justice Cory (for Iacobucci, McLachlin, and Sopinka) seems
to address this point:
The appellants are not alleging that the discrimination is unique or particular to their personal situation but, rather, that the Act discriminates against
all homosexual common law couples who are living in a state which is
comparable to heterosexual common law couples. It follows that the appellants must demonstrate that homosexual couples in general are denied equal
benefit of the law, not that they themselves are suffering a particular or
126
unique denial of a benefit. (emphasis added)
The only circumstance in which the effect of legislation or government action
on others would nullify a discrimination argument would be if the impugned
provision or action disadvantaged everybody with the same degree of adverse
effect. In that case, there would be no better-off comparator group.
2)
not all members of groups cited are affected by the Regulation
In Rodriguez, Chief Justice Lamer held that s. 241 (b) of the CriminalCode has
a discriminatory effect on the ground of disability, despite the fact that not all
disabled people were adversely affected by it:
It is moreover clear that the class of persons with physical disabilities is
broader than that of persons unable to end their lives unassisted. In other
words, some persons with physical disabilities are treated unequally by the

125. Egan, supra, note 2 at para 81.
126. Ibid. at para 153.
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effect of s. 241(b) of the Criminal Code, but not all persons, nor undoubtedly the majority of persons with disabilities, are so treated. The fact that
this is not a bar to a remedy under s. 15(1) seems to me to have been clearly
decided by Brooks, Allen and Dixon et al. v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1219; 94 N.R. 373; 58 Man.R.(2d) 161; 59 D.L.R.(4th) 321, and
Janzen and Govereau v. Pharos Restaurant and Grammas et al., [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1252; 95 N.R. 81; 58 Man.R.(2d) 1.
In Brooks, the question was whether unfavourable treatment on account of
pregnancy could be regarded as sex discrimination. Responding to the argument that this was not so because all women were not affected by this discriminatory provision, Dickson, C.J., said (at p. 1247):
"I am not persuaded by the argument that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy cannot amount to sex discrimination because not all women are
pregnant at any one time. While pregnancy-based discrimination only affects part of an identifiable group, it does not affect anyone who is not a
member of the group. Many, if not most, claims of partial discrimination fit
this pattern. As numerous decisions and authors have made clear, this fact
does not make the impugned distinction any less discriminating."
In Janzen this court had to determine whether sexual harassment was a form
of sex discrimination. The Court of Appeal had accepted the argument that
since all women were not affected by this type of behaviour, no discrimination had resulted. Dickson, C.J., rejected this argument as follows (at pp.
1288-1289):
"If a finding of discrimination required that every individual in the affected
group be treated identically, legislative protection against discrimination
would be of little or no value. It is rare that a discriminatory action is so
bluntly expressed as to treat all members of the relevant group identi127
cally."

THE S.1 ARGUMENT
The application of s.1 of the Charter is the area where the real battle in most
discriminatory-benefits cases, the one concerning the allocation of resources,
should be fought. This will not occur until the courts make better and more
consistent judgements concerning what issues are properly included under s.15.
This article will not provide a general review of leading cases on s. 1 to date, but
will be confined to a review of the treatment of s. 1 in the Egan, Thibaudeau,
Miron and Rodriguez cases. A review of these cases shows that the Supreme
Court still lacks a clear consensus as to the nature of relevant criteria, and
continues to exhibit lack of uniformity in regard to what evidence is considered
V.

127. Supra, note 8 at para 175-177.
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under what parts of enunciated tests. The following is an attempt to apply some
order to some rather inconsistent judgements.

A.

The Oakes standard andfurther developments

R. v. Oakes1 28 has maintained its status as the major referral point for s.1
analysis, being followed without further comment by Chief Justice Lamer in
Rodriguez and by Justice lacobucci for Justices Cory and McLachlin in Egan.
The Oakes test is summarized most succinctly by Justice Iacobucci in Egan:
three criteria must be satisfied: (1) the rights violation must be rationally
connected to the aim of the legislation; (2) the impugned provision must
minimally impair the Charter guarantee; and (3) there must be a proportionality between the effect of the measure and its objective so that the attainment of the legislative goal is not outweighed by the abridgement of the
right. In all s. 1 cases the burden of proof is with the government to show
129
on a balance of probabilities that the violation is justifiable.

Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's summary is even briefer:
In my view, there is no possible justification for a discriminatory distinction
other than that it is relevant to an important objective. As such, a distinction
found to violate s. 15(1) may only be saved under s. 1 if it is found to be
relevant to a proportionate extent to a pressing and substantial objective.
This is accomplished by reference to the framework to s. I analysis set
down in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 and modified by the majority of
this Court in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.,[1994 3 S.C.R.
835.130
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 and Justice Iacobucci, for Cory and McLachlin, noted that:
... in Big M, this Court held that a purpose may never, itself, be unconstitutional. By that same token, where the purpose of impugned legislation is, itself, discriminatory, it cannot be saved under s. 1. I would add, however,
that where the court has available to it several possible, and equally likely,
interpretations of the purpose of the legislation, then it should prefer one
that is consistent with Charter values over one that is not. 13 1

128. (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 (S.C.C.).
129. Supra, note 2 at para 189.
130. Ibid. at para 70.
131. Ibid. atpara7l and 210.
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Justices L'Heureux-Dub6 (as noted above) and McLachlin consider "the majority of this Court in Dagenais"'132 to have modified the proportionality part of
the test:
there must be a proportionality between the discriminatory effects of the
impugned distinction and the salutary effects of the distinction: Dagenais v.
133
Canadian Broadcasting Corp.
In Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at p.
889, Lamer C.J., writing for the majority, restated the proportionality of effects test as follows: "there must be a proportionality between the deleterious effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the right or
freedom in question and the objective, and there must be a proportionality
between the deleterious and the salutary effects of the measures" (emphasis
134
in original).
Justice Sopinka, speaking only for himself in Egan, added a further consideration to s.l:
...
government must be accorded some flexibility in extending social benefits and does not have to be pro-active in recognizing new social relationships. It is not realistic for the Court to assume that there are unlimited
funds to address the needs of all. A judicial approach on this basis would
tend to make a government reluctant to create any new social benefit
schemes because their limits would depend on an accurate prediction of the
outcome of court proceedings under s. 15(1) of the Charter.
This Court has recognized that it is legitimate for the government to make
choices between disadvantaged groups and that it must be provided with
some leeway to do so ...McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 229135
There seem to be two elements to Justice Sopinka's reasoning. The first is his
disturbing tendency 136 to accept the continuation of discriminatory situations
because legislatures or other institutions plead that they are too "new" to accept.
The second and major element is the implied assertion that a government's
"choices between disadvantaged groups" can be considered "legitimate" with-

132. Dagenaisv. CanadianBroadcastingCorp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 175 N.R. 1.
133. Egan, supra,note 2 per L'Heureux-Dube J. at para 76.
134. Thibaudeau,supra, note 3 per McLachlin, J. at para 233.
135. Egan, supra, note 2 at para 104-105.
136. See also: Human Rights Commission (Ont.) and Bates v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1992),
55 O.A.C. 81 (S.C.C.)
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out critical examination of the circumstances of any particular situation of
underinclusivity.
It is not clear whether Justice LaForest (writing in Egan for Lamer, Gonthier,
and Major) understood Justice Sopinka to be suggesting that critical examination was not necessary. He simply agrees that s.1 would save the impugned
provisions:
for the considerations set forth in my reasons in McKinney v. University of
Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, especially at pp. 316-18, some of which are
referred to in the reasons of my colleague Justice Sopinka, as well as for
those mentioned in my discussion of discrimination in the present case. 137
However, Justices L'Heureux-Dub6 and Iacobucci (for Cory and McLachlin)
clearly see the implications of Justice Sopinka's decision, and vehemently
disagreed:
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6:
It goes without saying that I cannot agree with the novel approach to s. 1
taken by Sopinka J. in this case, particularly in light of the following remarks by Dickson C.J. in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at p. 136:
A second contextual element of interpretation of s. 1 is provided by the
words "free and democratic society". Inclusion of these words as the final
standard of justification for limits on rights and freedoms refers the Court to
the very purpose for which the Charter was originally entrenched in the
Constitution: Canadian society is to be free and democratic. The Court must
be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic society which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group
identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society. The underlying values and
principles of a free and democratic society are the genesis of the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which
a limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be reasonable and demonstrably justified. [Emphasis added.]
There is a first time to every discrimination claim. To permit the novelty of
the appellants' claim to be a basis for justifying discrimination in a free and
democratic society undermines the very values which our Charter, including s. 1, seeks to preserve. 138

137. Supra, note 2 at para 29.
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Justice lacobucci (for Cory and McLachlin):
Since preparing these reasons, I have read the reasons of my colleague, Justice
Sopinka. I note that, although he finds the impugned statute to violate the
appellants' equality rights, he finds this violation to be justifiable in a free and
democratic society under s. 1. In reaching this conclusion, he relies heavily on
select passages from this Court's judgment in McKinney v. University of
Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, at pp. 317-19, per La Forest J. McKinney involved a s. 15 challenge launched by several professors to a university's mandatory retirement policy and a provision in the Ontario Human Rights Code
which limited the protection of the Code in the area of employment to those
under 65. These passages from McKinney may seem to support the extremely
deferential approach to s. 1 adopted by Sopinka J. However, a close examination of the McKinney decision reveals that La Forest J.'s comments therein can
be said to be limited to Charter review of provincial human rights legislation
governing private relations only. At page 318 of McKinney, immediately before
one of the passages cited by Sopinka J., the following appears:
The Charter, we saw earlier, was expressly framed so as not to apply to private conduct. It left the task of regulating and advancing the cause of
human rights in the private sector to the legislative branch. This invites a
measure of deference for legislative choice. As counsel for the Attorney
General for Saskatchewan colourfully put it, this "should lead us to ensure
that the Charter doesn't do through the back door what it clearly can't do
through the front door".
Furthermore, I find that the context of McKinney is wholly distinguishable
from the present appeal. This appeal involves a closely held personal characteristic (potentially only shared by a minority) upon which a distinction is
drawn without the array of competing interests that animated the s. 1 analysis in McKinney. The only competing interest in the case at bar is budgetary
in nature. The abolition of a mandatory retirement age, on the other hand,
affects many factors,including: the entire composition of the workforce; the
ability of younger people to secure jobs; access to university resources; promotion of academic freedom, excellence and renewal; collective bargaining
rights; and the structure of pension plans.
However, what causes me greater concern is my colleague's position that,
because the prohibition of discrimination against gays and lesbians is "of
recent origin" and "generally regarded as a novel concept" (p. 6), the government can be justified in discriminatorily denying same-sex couples a
benefit enuring to opposite-sex couples. Another argument he raises is that
the government can justify discriminatory legislation because of the possibility that it can take an incremental approach in providing state benefits.
With respect, I find both of these approaches to be undesirable. Permitting discrimination to be justified on account of the "novelty" of its prohibition or on
account of the need for governmental "incrementalism" introduces two unprecedented and potentially undefinable criteria into s. 1 analysis. It also permits s.
1 to be used in an unduly deferential manner well beyond anything found in the
prior jurisprudence of this Court. The very real possibility emerges that the
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government will always be able to uphold legislation that selectively and
discriminatorily allocates resources. This would undercut the values of the
Charter and belittle its purpose. I also find that many of the concerns raised
by Sopinka J. - such as according the legislature some time to amend discriminatory legislation - ought to inform the remedy, and should not serve
139
to uphold or legitimize discriminatory conduct: Schachter, supra.

B.

Section 1 and government services or benefits cases

The onus in s. 1 is on the government, and the arguments presented will of course
be specific to the legislation or government action at issue. The poverty law
advocate's rebuttal argument will also be issue-specific. However, some of the

issues addressed in Rodriguez, Thibaudeau, Egan, and Miron are likely to crop
up in litigation concerning discrimination in government services or benefits.
1.

Rational connection to a pressing and substantial objective

The government's stated objective in most cases is not discriminatory on its
face, and is therefore likely to pass the Big M part of the test. The objectives
stated in Rodriguez, Thibaudeau, Egan, and Miron, which passed the test, are

typical:
the protection of vulnerable people, whether they are consenting or not,
from the intervention of others in decisions respecting the planning and
140
commission of the act of suicide,
14 1
alleviation of poverty of elderly spouses,

protection of stable family units by insuring against the economic consequences that may follow from the injury of one of the members of the family, 142 and
increase of the resources of the broken family as a unit in order to increase
child support and ease the discharge of the non-custodial parent's obliga14 3
tions.
In some situations, it might be possible to argue that a stated objective is merely
an excuse for the real objective, the wish to save money. It has been reiterated
by the Supreme Court, usually in discussion of proportionality, that budgetary
considerations should not be determinative of a s. 1 analysis. However, the

139. Ibid. at para 213-216. The reference is to Schachter v. Canada [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679,
139 N.R. 1.
140. Rodriguez, supra, note 8 at para 186.
141. Egan, supra, note 2 at para 106 and 184.
142. Miron, supra,note 4 at para 109.
143. Thibaudeau,supra,note 3 at para 217.
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government has usually been given the benefit of the doubt about what its actual
objectives were.
Justice lacobucci dismissed an argument by the government that it would be too
expensive to include same-sex couples in CPP benefits, in Egan, under the
rational connection aspect of the s. 1 test. That was in the light of the lack of fit
between a stated legislative objective of alleviation of poverty of elderly
spouses, and the exclusion by that legislation of some poor elderly spouses.
Egan was a case of underinclusion; where the problem at issue can be seen as
overbreadth in a restriction rather than lack of inclusiveness, the lack of rational
connection may not be so obvious as it was in Egan. Chief Justice Lamer in
Rodriguez, considering a case of constructive discrimination that adversely
affected only disabled people who wanted to commit suicide but were too
disabled to do so independently, opined that "The question of overbreadth in
such circumstances is properly dealt with under the second component of the
proportionality test." 1 4 However, in all cases it is important to consider whether
it can be argued that the restriction is, in the words of the Chief Justice in
45
Rodriguez, not "carefully designed to meet the objective". 1
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in Egan found that a distinction on the basis of sexual
orientation was not rationally connected to the stated government objective. She
indicated that:
...
Discrimination on the basis of the legal status of the group affected (e.g.
citizenship, province of residence, marital status) may raise special problems in this respect, since legal status always comes attached with specific
rights and obligations. Because of the various rights and obligations which
differing status-based groups may enjoy, part of the rational connection determination in such instances may require some inquiry into whether the
distinction drawn in the impugned legislation is relevant to one or more of
those rights and/or obligations.
She went on, however:
If the distinction does not relate rationally to either a right or an obligation
which attaches to the affected status-based group, then I do not see how a
distinction drawn on the basis of membership in that status-based group
146
would not be irrelevant.

144. Supra, note 8 at para 190.
145. Ibid. at para 188.
146. Supra, note 2 at para 74.
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In Miron, Justice McLachlin (for Sopinka, Cory and Iacobucci) found that
marital status was not rationally connected to the government's stated objective.
She discussed the choice of "marker" for who should receive benefits, and
found:
... that in fixing on marital status as the criterion of eligibility for family accident benefits, the Legislature chose a criterion that was at best only collaterally related to its legislative goal; a criterion, moreover, that had the effect
of depriving a substantial number of deserving candidates of receipt of benefits. Better tests were available. In short, the Legislature did not choose a
147
reasonably relevant marker.
2.

proportionality between the effect of the measure and its objective so
that the attainment of the legislative goal is not outweighed by the
abridgement of the right

a) minimal impairment
In Rodriguez, the impugned overbroad provision effectively excluded certain
disabled persons from option of suicide. Exclusion is obviously maximum
impairment of a right. The Chief Justice found that did not satisfy the minimal
impairment test:
I find that an absolute prohibition that is indifferent to the individual or
the circumstances in question cannot satisfy the constitutional duty on the
govemment to impair the rights of persons with physical disabilities as little
as reasonably possible. 148
While the burden of proof of the applicability of s.1 is on the government, it is
useful to be prepared with suggestions as to how the government could have
achieved its stated objective in a less discriminatory way.
The Supreme Court has reiterated that:
Parliament does not have to have chosen the least intrusive means of all to
meet its objective. The fact that Parliament selected one of a range of
choices so as to impair the right or freedom protected by the Charter as little
as possible will suffice to meet the minimal impairment test: R. v. Chaulk,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303, and R. v. Swain, [19911 1 S.C.R. 933.149
Justice L'Heureux-Dubd phrased this consideration somewhat less broadly in
Egan:

147. Supra, note 4 at para 171.
148. Supra, at para 204.

149. Thibaudeau,supra,note 3 per McLachlin J. at para 223.
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...the difficulty or impossibility of finding a workable alternative basis of
distinction may be a valid consideration under this branch of the proportionality test. 150

However, the Chief Justice in Rodriguez cautioned that:
...concern for the intricate and delicate function of Parliament to choose
between differing reasonable policy options, some of which may impair a
particular individual or group's rights more than others, should not be misconstrued as providing Parliament with a license for indifference to whatever Charter rights it deems necessary. As La Forest, J., observed in
Thtreault-Gadoury c. Canada Employment and Immigration Commission,
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 22; 126 N.R. 1; 81 D.L.R.(4th) 358, at p. 44:
"It should go without saying, however, that the deference that will be accorded to the government when legislating in these matters does not give
them an unrestricted licence to disregard an individual's Charter rights.
Where the government cannot show that it had a reasonable basis for concluding that it has complied with the requirement of minimal impairment in
seeking to attain its objectives, the legislation will be struck down. For example, in Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association (1986), 54 O.R.(2d)
513, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that s. 19(2) of the Ontario Human
Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c. 53, which permitted discrimination in athletic organizations and activities on the basis of sex, could not be justified
under s. 1. Writing for the majority, Dubin, J.A. (as he then was), emphasized (at p. 530) that the sweeping effects of s. 19(2) were disproportionate
to the ends sought to be achieved, and that the government had made no effort to justify this broad scope as a reasonable limit on the right to equality." 15 1
In the s.1 analyses in Rodriguez, Thibaudeau,Miron and Egan, the existence of
alternatives to the impugned measures was considered significant. Further, there
52
was no requirement that the alternative measures be "free from problems". 1

The availability of a benefit from another source was not considered by Justice
153
Iacobucci (for Cory and McLachlin) to ameliorate impairment.

b)
proportionality of effect
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in Egan summarized the issue of proportionality:

150. Supra, note 2 at para 75.
151. Supra, note 8 at para 196.
152. Thibaudeau,supra, note 3 at para 227.
153. See Egan, supra, note 2 at para 208.

(1995) 11 Journalof Law and Social Policy

... there must be a proportionality between the discriminatory effects of the
impugned distinction and the salutary effects of the distinction: Dagenais v.
Canadian Broadcasting Corp., supra. Factors such as the importance of the
state interest, the extent to which it is furthered by the impugned distinction,
the constitutional and societal significance of the interests adversely affected,
the severity of the rights deprivation suffered by the individual, and the potential for entrenching marginalization or stigmatization of particular groups will
all be relevant considerations to this branch of the s. 1 examination. The government must shoulder a heavier justificatory burden when the Charter infringement is severe: Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal
Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at p. 1190.154
In many cases of denial of government services and benefits, there is no obvious

advantage to the government to be balanced against the impairment of the
clients' rights, other than cost saving. As noted above, cost-saving has not been
accorded enormous weight. Further, evidence as to actual savings is open to

challenge, particularly if it is speculative.
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in Egan:
It can be argued that the primary salutary effect of the distinction, on the other
hand, is the savings it ostensibly entails to the public purse. The government's
expert estimates this saving as ranging between $12 million and $37 million.
The appellants' cross-examination at trial of that expert suggests that this figure
may be considerably less. I would nonetheless make three observations in relation to this argument. First, by the government's own account, these sums
account for only between two and four percent of the total cost of the old
age supplement program. Second, I have referred to these savings as "ostensible" because if the affected persons had been in heterosexual relationships instead of homosexual relationships, the government would have to have paid out
this money anyway. Finally, I note that the majority of this Court recognized
in Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at p. 709, that budgetary considerations should not be determinative of a s. 1 analysis, and should more
properly be considered when attempting to formulate an appropriate remedy. On this basis, I conclude that the deleterious effects of the impugned
55
distinction outweigh its salutary effects. 1

Justice Iacobucci (for Cory and McLachlin), in Egan:
The respondent Crown submits the cost of such an extension of benefits constitutes grounds for upholding the s. 15 limitation. Mr. Hagglund has estimated the
cost of including same-sex spousal cohabitants as ranging from $12 million to
$37 million per annum (see Case on Appeal, at p. 123). This evidence is highly
speculative and statistically weak and thus accordingly incorporates guesswork.

154. Ibid. at para 76.
155. Ibid. at para 99.
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For example, it is based on his generous estimates of the number of eligible
same-sex couples and fails to take into account the fact that many of these
households will be ineligible because they surpass the maximum income criteria. However, assuming arguendo that Mr. Hagglund's figures are valid, I find,
as a question of law, that they do not justify the denial of the appellants' right to
equality.
The jurisprudence of this Court reveals, as a general matter, a reluctance to accord much weight to financial considerations under a s. 1 analysis. In Schachter,
supra, at p. 709, the Chief Justice noted that "[t]his Court has held, and rightly
so, that budgetary considerations cannot be used to justify a violation under s.
1 ". This is certainly the case when the financial motivations are not, as in the
case at bar, supported by more persuasive arguments as to why the infringement
amounts to a reasonable limit. 156
CONCLUSION
There is no question that a s. 15 challenge is also a challenge to the ingenuity
and staying power of the poverty law advocate. In Miron, Justice L'HeureuxDub6 acknowledged that consistent direction cannot be obtained, as yet, from
our highest court:
There is no more important task in approaching any Charter right than that
of characterizing properly its purpose: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1
S.C.R. 295. Defining with accuracy and sensitivity the purpose of a particular right is, in short, the starting point for rights analysis. By implication, a
right is said to be violated when the purpose of that right is denied, undermined, or frustrated by legislative action. Disagreement, no matter how
small, at the foundational level of establishing the right's purpose will only
magnify over time in terms of how that right is applied. More difficult
cases, quite naturally, will only make these differences more apparent. I believe that this phenomenon is beginning to manifest itself in the divergent
approaches to s. 15 taken in recent cases before this Court, of which this
case, Miron v. Trudel, No. 22794, and Thibaudeau v. Canada, No. 24154,
released concurrently, are no exception. The emergence of these differences suggests to me that we may not necessarily be operating with the
same underlying purpose in mind. (emphasis added) 157
This article clearly reveals my viewpoint: despite the complexity of the issues
and the judicial myopia exhibited in some of the cases, I urge poverty law
advocates to consider undertaking s. 15 arguments. Section 15 remains a potentially powerful weapon, and in my view, it is far too early to abandon attempts
to use it to redress injustice for poverty law clients.
Once again, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 provides an appropriate thought:
156. Ibid. at para 193-4.
157. Supra, note 4 at para 32.
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For s. 15 jurisprudence to continue to develop along principled lines, I believe that two things are necessary: (1) we must revisit the fundamental purpose of s. 15; and (2) we must seek out a means by which to give full effect
158
to this fundamental purpose.
Unless thejudiciary continue to be faced with the complex problems of discrimination that affect poor people, the jurisprudence will develop without some of
the most fundamental questions of principle being addressed.

158. Ibid.

